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AbSTRACT
For nearly twenty-five years, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention has provided a well-respected jurisprudence on fundamental hu-
man rights, such as: freedom of expression and religion; limits on administra-
tive detention; restrictions on discrimination in detention; and violations of 
the right to fair trial. The Working Group has amassed a unique collection 
of legal principles applicable to individuals detained by the United States, 
including asylum seekers, immigrants, and refugees. The decisions of the 
Working Group have also applied to non-state actors.
I. oVERVIEW of THE WoRkING GRoUP
A. History of the Working Group
In 1991, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights created the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.1 As the Working Group nears its 
twenty-fifth anniversary, and with the need to address arbitrary detention 
never more important than it is right now, this article examines the Work-
ing Group’s procedures and jurisprudence from the past twenty-four years. 
In 2006, the United Nations General Assembly created the Human Rights 
Council to replace the Human Rights Commission, and the Human Rights 
Council assumed all mandates of the Commission in its decision 1/102 in 
November 2006.2 The Working Group is one of forty-one thematic special 
procedures with a mandate to advise the Human Rights Council on specific 
issue areas.3
The Working Group mandate reflects the Commission’s concerns—first 
explicitly addressed in 1986—regarding worldwide instances of detention 
  1. Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, History—Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/History.aspx. 
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established by Resolution 1991/42 of 
the Commission on Human Rights. Id.; see also C.H.R. Res. 1991/42, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1991/22, at 105 (1991). The mandate of the Working Group was clarified and 
extended by resolution 1997/50. Commission on Human Rights Res. 1997/50, Question 
of Arbitrary Detention, ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 164, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/50 (1997). 
For a historical account, see Reed Brody, Current Development: The United Nations 
Creates a Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 85 Am. J. int’l l. 709 (1991).
  2. History—Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 1. The Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention’s mandate was then extended for three years by Human Rights 
Council Resolution 6/4 in 2007 and for another three years in 2010 by resolution 15/18. 
Id.
  3. Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Procedures of the Human Rights 
Council, available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx.
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without legal basis.4 These examples include continued detention after 
serving the term of one’s sentence, detention based upon the exercise of 
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, and violations of the 
right to a fair trial.5 
Because detention itself does not necessarily violate human rights, the 
Working Group must distinguish lawful exercise of the police power, properly 
adjudicated in accord with both domestic law and other relevant interna-
tional standards, from detention so lacking in lawful basis that it must be 
considered arbitrary.6 This inquiry may include asylum and other immigration 
claims,7 extended quarantines,8 and detentions related to national security 
and anti-terrorism.9 In considering such cases, the Working Group is guided 
not only by national law, but also by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“Universal Declaration”), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“Covenant”), and other relevant international instruments.10
The Working Group consists of five individual members who are ap-
pointed by the Human Rights Council in equitable geographical distribution 
from the following regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe 
and Other Countries, and South America and Caribbean.11 As of September 
2015, the members were from South Korea, Mexico, Benin, Australia, and 
  4. Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 26, The Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention, § II, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
FactSheet26en.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 26].
  5. Id. § III.
  6. Id. § IV(B).
  7. See, e.g., Mohamed Bousloub v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 34, ¶ 5 (1999). See also U.N. ESCOR, 
54th Sess., Provision Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/44 (1997); M. Gavan 
Montague, Should Aliens be Indefinitely Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231? Suspect 
Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 fordHAm l. rev. 1439 
(2001); Eve B. Burton & David B. Goldstein, Vietnamese Women and Children Refugees 
in Hong Kong: An Argument Against Arbitrary Detention, 4 duke J. Comp. & int’l l. 71 
(2003).
  8. Creola Johnson, Quarantining HIV-Infected Haitians: United States’ Violations of In-
ternational Law at Guantanamo Bay, 37 HoW. l. J. 305 (1994); Carlos Scott López, 
Prolonged Administrative Detention of Illegal Arrivals in Australia: The Untenable HIV/
Aids Justification, 4 WAsH. u. gloBAl stud. l. rev. 263 (2005).
  9. See, e.g., Mourad Benchellali v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.2004/3/Add.1, at 33, 34, ¶ 9 (2003). For a pre-9/11 view, 
see John Quigley, Israel’s Forty-Five Year Emergency: Are there Time Limits to Derogations 
from Human Rights Obligations?, 15 miCH. J. int’l. l. 491 (1994). See also Jules Lobel, 
Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists and Permanent Emergency, 25 t. 
Jefferson l. rev. 389 (2003).
 10. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § IV(B); see also Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71, art. 9 (1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 
Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16), U.N. Doc A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 11. Id. § III.
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Ukraine.12 The High Commissioner specifically entrusts these individuals 
with three tasks: 
1. Investigation of individual complaints of arbitrary detention; 
2. Field missions upon invitation of specific national governments;13 and 
3. Annual Reports to the Human Rights Council.14 
b. Working Group Competence
While acting broadly within its mandate, the Working Group is subject to 
three important restrictions. First, it is concerned with the fact of arbitrary 
detention itself, as distinct from its aggravating circumstances. Information 
about summary execution, forced disappearance, torture, or other claims are 
therefore outside its purview and are referred to other appropriate United 
Nations human rights bodies.15 Nonetheless, where the facts surrounding 
the detention intertwine with other human rights violations such as torture, 
those circumstances contribute to the overall evidentiary picture and the 
Working Group routinely issues opinions in cases where both torture and 
arbitrary detention are involved.16 Second, reports regarding arbitrary deten-
tion must be made against a state government. The Working Group lacks 
competence to consider actions taken by an illegal paramilitary group.17 
 12. Chairperson-Rapporteur Mr. Seong-Phil Hong, Republic of Korea (appointed 2014); First 
Vice-Chair Mr. José Guevara, Mexico (2014); Second Vice-Chair Mr. Sètondji Adjovi, 
Benin (2014); Ms. Leigh Toomey, Australia (2015); and Mr. Vladimir Tochilovsky, Ukraine 
(2010). The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Members, offiCe of HigH Commis-
sioner for HumAn rigHts, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/
Members.aspx.
 13. The Working Group does not appear to be beyond making pointed requests for such 
invitations. See, e.g., 2005 Annual Report at 13, ¶ 31.
 14. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § II, ¶ 6 (2011).
 15. Such as the Human Rights Committee, Special Rapporteur on Torture, the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, and the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child. See, e.g., Manuel Flores et al. v. Philippines, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1 at 79, ¶ 11 (2002) (referring a case involv-
ing minor detainees).
 16. See, e.g., Rodolfo Montiel Flores and Teodoro Cabrera García v. Mexico, Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 85, ¶¶ 4–7 (2001); The 
Working Group may even both issue an opinion and refer the case to the Special Rap-
porteur. Paw Oo Tun v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 63, ¶ 14(ii) (2001); The Working Group also issued at least 
one opinion in a case that also involved the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights. Father Hillary Boma Awul v. Sudan, Working Group on Arbitrary De-
tention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 18, ¶ 21 (1999) (citing the Rapporteur’s 
report as E/CN.4/1999/38/Add.1 (1999)).
 17. Olga Rodas v. Colombia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 7, ¶ 5 (1999). The detainees in Rodas were released before 
an opinion could be issued; nonetheless, the Working Group referred the case to the 
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Third, the Working Group’s competence does not formally extend to armed 
conflicts covered by the Geneva Conventions.18 The Working Group, however, 
is clearly concerned with counterterrorism-related detentions. As discussed 
in more detail below, the Working Group has investigated allegations of 
arbitrary detention leveled against governments engaged in armed conflict 
with alleged terrorist organizations and other types of armed conflict.19 The 
fact that the detention may also involve the application of international 
humanitarian law does not shield a government from its obligations under 
international human rights law, nor does it preclude the Working Group 
from investigating a government’s actions from the perspective of its mandate 
to determine whether the detention is arbitrary.20 The Working Group will, 
therefore, consider reported violations of governments in armed conflict.21 
The Working Group does not require the exhaustion of local remedies, 
but its purpose is not to replace national courts.22 While the Working Group 
evaluates the facts and evidence in a particular case as part of its investiga-
tive role, making findings of fact in the judicial sense is outside its remit.23 
   United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and also requested that the government 
of Colombia commence an investigation. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. The mere involvement of non-state 
actors does not, however, absolve an accused government of its responsibility to enforce 
the law. Volodymyr Timchenko v. Nigeria, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 24, ¶ 18(b) (1999).
 18. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, Annex IV, § III(A), ¶ 14. The International Committee 
of the Red Cross is the historical guarantor of the rights to prisoners of war (“POWs”). 
When POW status is denied, however, Red Cross action does not preclude an investiga-
tion by the Working Group. See, e.g., Mourad Benchellali v. United States of America, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1 at 34–35, ¶¶ 
6–7, 11–12 (2003).
 19. See, e.g., infra Part III(4).
 20. In a thematic consideration in its 2010 annual report, the Working Group relied on 
both the Human Rights Committee’s finding in its General Comment No. 31 and the 
International Court of Justice’s rulings in its Advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and its binding 
judgment in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda that human rights 
law continues to apply to situations of armed conflict except for those rights found to 
be legitimately derogated by Article 4 of the ICCPR. Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/47, § III(A), ¶¶ 37–42 (2010). 
 21. Id. ¶ 51. 
 22. “Similarly, the Working Group does not require local remedies to be exhausted in order 
for a communication to be declared admissible.” Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § V(A). 
This position is explicitly confirmed, as against a government argument to the contrary, 
in the “Sledgehammer” cases (Turkey) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/6, ¶ 69 (2013) (noting that “the Working Group would not 
be able to fulfil its mandate to consider cases of violations of the right of the accused 
to be tried within a reasonable time or to be released.”)
 23. Yang Jianli v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/
Add.1 at 28, ¶ 17 (2003). This position may be somewhat contravened in actual prac-
tice. See, e.g., the apparently fact-rich analysis of Jan Borek v. United States of America, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 16, ¶¶ 
11–20 (2000).
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The Working Group nonetheless explicitly asserts its competence to apply 
international standards, whether in pending cases24 or after a national court 
has rendered final judgment.25 The Working Group may even, at its discre-
tion, issue an opinion after the release of the person(s) concerned.26 
C. The Working Group’s Jurisdiction over Non-Parties to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes the fun-
damental legal grounds on which the Working Group relies for jurisdiction 
over parties to the Covenant. Nonetheless, the failure of specific countries to 
adopt the Covenant does not by itself defeat the Working Group’s ability to 
exert jurisdiction over non-parties on other grounds. In 2012, the Working 
Group published its Deliberation No. 9 considering the standing of arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty under customary international law.27 The Group first 
noted that arbitrary detention is prohibited in all major international and 
regional human rights mechanisms. Several United Nations resolutions refer 
to this prohibition and the International Court of Justice relies on it to find 
violations of international law.28 Additionally, the Working Group found that 
arbitrary detention and arrest are prohibited in the domestic laws of many 
countries that are not parties to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, such as China and Saudi Arabia.29 
The prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the right to chal-
lenge detention before a court are also non-derogable rights under customary 
international law.30 Any state defenses regarding necessary or proportionate 
 24. Yang Jianli v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/
Add.1 at 28, ¶ 17 (2003).
 25. Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1 at 33, 35 ¶¶ 8–10, 22–23 (2001).
 26. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § IV(A); See, e.g., Fateh Jamus and Issam Dimashqi v. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/
Add.1 at 104, ¶ 13 (2000). “Closed” cases are also subject to review under the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, opened for signature 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 301 
(entered into force 23 Mar. 1976). As of December 2013 there were 167 state parties 
to the ICCPR, and 115 states parties to the (first) Optional Protocol. United Nations 
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV: Human Rights, available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/
Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en; See also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Refugees and 
Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century: Lesson from the South Pacific, 12 pAC. rim l. 
& pol’y J. 23, 38–39 (2003).
 27. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/22/44, ¶¶ 
37–85 (24 Dec. 2012).
 28. Id. ¶¶ 42–44.
 29. Id. ¶ 46.
 30. Id. ¶ 47.
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measures are factored into the consideration of whether deprivation of liberty 
in any given circumstance is considered arbitrary.31 Therefore, the deprivation 
of an individual’s liberty may still be considered arbitrary under customary 
international law if the necessity claimed by the state does not outweigh 
the unjust, illegal, or unpredictable nature of the detention.32
In relation to the term “arbitrary,” the Working Group determined that 
it should be interpreted under customary international law to include not 
only detention considered against the law but also “elements of inappro-
priateness, injustice, lack of predictability, and due process of law.”33 The 
word “detention” should be interpreted broadly to include “house arrest; 
re-education through labour; prolonged periods of curfew; detention of 
migrants and asylum seekers; protective custody; detention for rehabilitation 
or treatment; detention in transit areas; border control check points, etc.”34 
Furthermore, arbitrary detention under customary international law includes 
prolonged pretrial detention and detention without access to a lawyer or 
other necessary tools for an effective legal defense.35 
D. The Working Group and the United States
The Working Group is the “only body in the international human rights system 
entrusted . . . with a specific mandate to receive and examine cases of arbi-
trary deprivation of liberty.”36 As discussed above, the Working Group relies 
primarily on the Universal Declaration and the Civil and Political Covenant 
in determining whether a situation amounts to arbitrary detention, although 
it will also consider other treaties and principles of customary international 
law.37 As the United States was an original signatory to the Universal Decla-
ration and is a state party to the Civil and Political Covenant, it has a clear 
international obligation to comply with the prohibition of arbitrary detention. 
While the United States is a party to or signatory of many international 
human rights standards, it has not ratified any of the optional protocols of 
treaties that would enable treaty bodies to review individual or collective 
complaints against the US government.38 Therefore, the procedures of the 
Working Group provide one of only a few potential outlets for individuals 
 31. Id. ¶ 48.
 32. Id. ¶¶ 47–50.
 33. Id. ¶ 61.
 34. Id. ¶ 82.
 35. Id. ¶¶ 84–85. 
 36. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/22/44, ¶¶ 
37–85 (24 Dec. 2012).
 37. See supra Part I(A); see also infra Part IV(F)(1).
 38. Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, 34 yAle J. int’l l. 389, 410 (2009).
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whose rights have been violated by the United States government to bring 
complaints.39 Unfortunately, the United States has typically only taken opin-
ions issued by individual complaint mechanisms as advisory and optional.40 
Over the past fifteen years, there have been over twenty Working Group 
opinions regarding the actions of the United States that resulted in a con-
clusion of arbitrary detention. Although many of the individuals considered 
arbitrarily detained in the United States have been released, such releases 
are not typically carried out directly following the Working Group’s decision 
or with any reference to the Working Group’s concerns.41 
II. WoRkING GRoUP PRoCEDURES
A. Advisory Procedures
The Working Group undertakes three forms of advisory procedure: annual 
reports, field missions, and deliberations. These functions are distinct from 
the adversarial procedure of investigation, which concerns individual com-
plaints of arbitrary detention.
1. Annual Reports
The Working Group submits Annual Reports to the Human Rights Council.42 
Annual Reports include a summary of other Working Group activities, such 
as field missions, deliberations, and investigations, as well as statistical sum-
maries of the year’s cases.43 
 39. The only two other mechanisms for individual complaints to which the United States 
is a party are the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and “precautionary 
measure or early warning/urgent action procedures recognized by the [Inter-American] 
Commission and U.N. human rights treaty bodies.” Id.
 40. See infra, Part III(4); Melish, supra note 38; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) 
(ruling that decisions by the International Court of Justice were not binding in the United 
States, but rather suggestions for future actions).
 41. See, e.g., infra note 108. Occasionally, individuals being held are not released until there 
is a change in the executive administration, such as the case of Mr. Ali Saleh Kahlah 
Al-Marri, whose detention the Working Group found arbitrary in 2006, although his case 
reached the Supreme Court before the new Obama administration transferred him from 
military to federal custody. See Mr. Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri v. United States of America, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 43/2006, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4/
Add.1 at 29 (2007); Lyle Denniston, Al-Marri Detention Case Ended, sCotusBlog (6 
Mar. 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/03/al-marri-overruled/. 
 42. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § II, ¶ 6 (2010).
 43. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § VI.
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2. Field Missions 
The Working Group undertakes approximately one to three field missions 
each year.44 In 2011, for example, the Working Group visited Georgia and 
Germany,45 and in 2012 the Working Group visited El Salvador.46 Field mis-
sions encompass a wide range of detention-related issues. The 2009 Senegal 
mission, for example, yielded a series of recommendations, including: sepa-
rating adult female detainees from minors; establishing the prison catering 
budget based on the actual number of inmates (rather than the theoretical 
capacity of the prison); using a legal assistance fund to increase the number 
of defense lawyers in remote regions of the country; and establishing im-
proved procedures for gathering and maintaining information on detainees, 
including a single register for each detention site.47 
3. Deliberations 
The Working Group also pursues a more general advisory role via delib-
erations. Deliberations are designed to establish a position of principles, 
formulated around potentially problematic practices.48 Similar to the gen-
eral comments used by treaty bodies to assist states in interpreting treaties, 
deliberations provide guidance on general issues.49 Deliberation topics in-
clude: restricted or house arrest;50 rehabilitation through labor;51 guarantees 
concerning detention of immigrants and asylum-seekers;52 issues related to 
psychiatric detention;53 and deprivation of liberty linked to/resulting from 
the use of the Internet.54 Findings expressed in specific deliberations will be 
discussed further in Part IV.
 44. Field missions are also referred to as “country visits” or “country missions.” Fact Sheet 
No. 26, supra note 4, § V(D).
 45. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/57 at 1 
(2011). 
 46. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/44 at 1 
(2011). 
 47. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Mission to Senegal, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/13/30/Add.3 at 16–17.
 48. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § V(B). A full compilation of Working Group delibera-
tions is available on the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights website. See 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ Issues/Detention/CompilationWGADDeliberation.pdf. 
 49. Id.; see also, e.g., Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General Comment No. 9, CRC/C/
GC/9 (2006). 
 50. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/24 (1993). 
 51. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/24 (1993).
 52. U.N. Commission on Human Rights Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 
regarding the situation of immigrants and asylum seekers, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/, 
Annex, § II (1999).
 53. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6, ¶ 47 
(2004).
 54. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/7, ¶ 32 
(2005).
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b. Categories of Arbitrary Detention
The Working Group investigates claims of arbitrary detention according to 
several categories:55
1. Deprivation of Liberty without Legal Justification
When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation 
of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his 
sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to him).56
2. Deprivation of Liberty Resulting from the Exercise of Universal 
Human Rights.
When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 7, 13–14, 
18–21) or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 12, 
18–19, 21–22, and 25–27).57
3. Grave Violations of the Right to Fair Trial
When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to 
the right to a fair trial, spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and in the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, 
is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character.58
4. Prolonged Administrative Custody
When asylum seekers, immigrants, or refugees are subjected to prolonged ad-
ministrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review 
or remedy.59
5. Deprivation of Liberty as a Violation of International Anti-
Discrimination Standards. 
When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of the international law 
for reasons of discrimination based on birth; national, ethnic or social origin; 
 55. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § III, ¶ 8 (2010).
 56. Id. For recent Working Group jurisprudence on this category, see infra part IV(A).
 57. Id. For recent Working Group jurisprudence on this category, see infra part IV(B).
 58. Id. For recent Working Group jurisprudence on this category, see infra part IV(C).
 59. Id. For recent Working Group jurisprudence on this category, see infra part IV(D).
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language; religion; economic condition; political or other opinion; gender; sexual 
orientation; disability or other status, and which aims towards or can result in 
ignoring the equality of human rights.60
C. Investigations
The Working Group’s most powerful tool in addressing the problem of arbi-
trary detention is the investigation into individual complaints. An investigation 
proceeds by four distinct steps: (1) a source brings a claim; (2) the accused 
government has an opportunity to reply; (3) the source may respond; and 
(4) an opinion may be issued.
1. Stage One: Bringing a Matter to the Working Group
A source may bring a report of arbitrary detention before the Working Group 
by communicating with its Geneva Office, ideally using the Model Question-
naire available through the Working Group’s Secretariat.61 The source must 
sign the report, but need not be the actual person detained; a member of the 
detainee’s family or other representative may file on the detainee’s behalf.62 
Practical information such as the Working Group’s mailing, facsimile, or 
email address appears on the Working Group’s website.63 
As a procedural matter, the source may be an individual, an NGO, or, 
in certain circumstances, a government or inter-governmental agency.64 The 
source is not revealed to the accused government; all identifying details are 
kept strictly confidential.65 The Working Group may also initiate its own in-
vestigations when its attention is drawn to sufficiently substantiated reports.66 
 60. Id. For recent Working Group jurisprudence on this category, see infra part IV(E).
 61. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § III, ¶ 8 (2011).
 62. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, Annex IV, § III A, ¶ 12. This action is analogous to a 
next friend action, for example in habeas corpus proceedings. Generally, an unrelated 
source must have evidence of authorization, but the absence of such evidence need 
not be fatal if, under the circumstances, it is not readily available. Id. Annex V, n.10.
 63. Contact, offiCe of HigH Commissioner for HumAn rigHts, available at http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/Issues/Detention/Pages/Contact.aspx. The address is Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, c/o Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations 
Office at Geneva, 8–14, avenue de la Paix, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland; facsimile: 
+41 22 9179006; e-mail: wgad@ohchr.org. 
 64. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § IV(A), ¶ 12 (2010).
 65. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § V(A), ¶ 5; Annex § V, n. 10. While the issue is not 
formally addressed by the working group, it is nonetheless obvious that the circumstances 
of a particular detention may tend to identify the source, whether the Working Group 
does so or not.
 66. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § IV(A), ¶ 13 (2010).
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2. Stage Two: Opportunity to Refute
In Stage Two, the accused government is provided an opportunity to refute 
the report. The source remains confidential and the government has sixty 
days to respond, although it may request an extension of up to one month 
if necessary.67 The response may address both the facts of the detention and 
the relevant law on which it was based, as well as any of the government’s 
own investigations into the case.68 
3. Stage Three: Comments on the Response
In Stage Three, the source is allowed an opportunity to comment on the 
government’s response. If there is no response, the Working Group may 
proceed directly to issue an Opinion.69 
4. Stage Four: The Opinion
In issuing an opinion, the Working Group may find that the case is one of 
arbitrary detention, it may keep the case open for further information (from 
either the government or the source), or it may determine that the detention 
is not arbitrary.70 In the event that the person in question is released before 
the Working Group completes its investigation, it may either file the case 
or, at its discretion, issue an opinion.71 Opinions are provided to the ac-
cused government first, then (two weeks later) to the source, and ultimately 
published by the UN.72 
 67. Id. § IV(B), ¶¶ 15–16.
 68. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § V A, ¶ 4. 
 69. Id., § V(A), ¶ 7.
 70. Id., § V(A), ¶ 8. Cases that remain pending for further information are filed under ¶ 
17(c) of the methods of work. See, e.g., Francisco José Cortés Aguilar et al. v. Bolivia, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 55, ¶ 22 
(2004). Cases in which neither the source nor government provide sufficient information 
on which to form an opinion are filed provisionally under ¶ 17(d). See, e.g., Andrei 
Ivantoc v. Republic of Moldova, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4.2005/6/Add.1 at 44, ¶ 17 (2004). Cases which do not constitute arbitrary deten-
tion are filed under ¶ 17(b). See, e.g., Azihar Salim v. Madagascar, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.2005/6/Add.1 at 52, ¶ 15 (2004).
 71. Compare Leonilo de la Cruz v. Philippines, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1 at 20, ¶ 4 (1998) (filed under ¶ 14(a) of the methods of 
work); Vladimir Nikolic and Xhevat Podvorica v. Yugoslavia, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 49, ¶ 5 (2001) (filed under ¶ 17(a) 
of the methods of work) to Fateh Jamus and Issam Dimashqi v. Syrian Arab Republic, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.2001/14/Add.1 at 104, ¶¶ 
10–12 (2000) (opinion issued).
 72. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § IV(C), ¶ 18 (2011).
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D. The Urgent Action
At its discretion, or if a source raises sufficiently reliable information that 
continuation of the reported deprivation poses a serious threat to the in-
dividual’s health—both physical and psychological—or life, the Working 
Group may pursue an urgent action.73 In such cases, the most rapid means 
of communication is used to contact the Foreign Minister (or equivalent) of 
the accused government, requesting “measures to ensure that the detained 
person’s rights to life and physical and mental integrity are respected.”74 An 
urgent action is an independent and purely humanitarian undertaking, and 
is not always followed by an opinion. To the extent that an opinion is later 
issued, it should not be prejudiced by the fact that an urgent action took 
place.75 In recent years, the Working Group has typically issued around one 
hundred urgent actions annually.76
III. WoRkING GRoUP JURISPRUDENCE77
The Working Group has developed an important body of opinions over 
the past twenty-four years. Taken together, the Working Group’s opinions 
 73. Id. § V, ¶ 22. 
 74. Fact Sheet No. 26, supra note 4, § V(C).
 75. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention—Revised Methods of Work of the 
Working Group, A/HRC/16/47, Annex, § V, ¶ 23 (2010).
 76. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/47, 
§ II(A)(6), ¶23 (2012); Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/19/57, § II(A), ¶ 18, tab. 2 (2011). The response rate to urgent actions was about 
43 percent in 2003, and only 33 percent in 2004. Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6 at 13, ¶ 32 (2004). Report of the Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/7 at 13, ¶ 27 (2005). In 2011, 
however, the Working Group submitted 108 urgent appeals to 45 different governments, 
referencing 1,629 different individuals. Only twenty-one individuals were released in 
response to these appeals. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/19/57 at § II(A), ¶ 26, tab. 2 (2011).
 77. Both scholarship and legal advocacy require extensive research, and the problem of 
arbitrary detention is no exception. In either activity, the University of Minnesota Human 
Rights Library is an invaluable resource. The Minnesota Human Rights Library provides 
online service in nine languages (English, French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, 
Swedish, Korean, and Japanese), and in standard online, pda, and mobile phone for-
mat, at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/. There is a mirror site in Tunisia. In addition 
to Working Group Opinions, the Library includes extensive refugee and asylum law 
resources, treaties and other United Nations documents, and substantial K-12 education 
resources. The Library also provides a search engine for international case law, includ-
ing records from the Commission on Human Rights, the Committee against Torture, the 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, and some six hundred 
Working Group opinions dating from 1998 to present. As with other Library resources, 
the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library offers free access to this material for 
anyone, from essentially anywhere in the world. 
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articulate how international human rights standards should be applied in 
the context of government detention of individuals. As such, the Group’s 
written body of work has contributed substantively to the international de-
bate over the very difficult question of when detention by the state violates 
international norms. 
International instruments are not definitive regarding the question of 
when detention is arbitrary. The Universal Declaration only states that “no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,” and the Civil 
and Political Covenant only slightly expands on this definition.78 In consid-
ering whether a given instance qualifies as arbitrary detention, the Working 
Group first consults the Universal Declaration and the Covenant,79 but will 
also consider General Assembly Resolution 43/173 on the principles for 
protecting detained or imprisoned individuals80 and other UN resolutions 
and international standards.81 This section contains an overview of the juris-
prudence of the Working Group, organized based on the Working Group’s 
five legal categories of arbitrary detention: (1) Deprivation of liberty without 
legal justification; (2) Deprivation of liberty resulting from the exercise of 
universal human rights; (3) Deprivation of liberty resulting from violations 
of the right to fair trial; (4) Prolonged administrative custody of asylum seek-
ers, immigrants, or refugees; and (5) Deprivation of liberty as a violation of 
international anti-discrimination standards.
A.	 Category	I:	Deprivation	of	Liberty	without	Legal	Justification
The Working Group’s first consideration is whether an individual’s detention 
lacks legal justification. Situations that fall into Category I include individuals 
who have never been presented with legal justification, detainees whose 
legal justification has expired, or those persons who are incorrectly detained 
for their own benefit (i.e., protective custody).
 78. UDHR, supra note 10, at 71, art. 9; see also ICCPR, supra note 10, at 52, art. 9(1) 
(“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”) Id.
 79. The Working Group will particularly look to Articles 7, 9–11, 13–14, 18–21 in the 
UDHR and Articles 9, 12, 14, 18–19, 21–22, 25–27 in the ICCPR. See Fact Sheet No. 
26, supra note 4, Annex I.
 80. See id. Annex II.
 81. See International Standards—Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, offiCe of HigH 
Commissioner for HumAn rigHts, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Detention/
Pages/History.aspx.
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1. Deprivation of Liberty Following Arrest Without Warrant or Formal 
Charges Constitutes Arbitrary Detention
Individuals should not be detained without being informed of the reasons 
for arrest or charges against them. For example, agents of the Internal Secu-
rity Services in Libya arrested Dr. Mohamed Hassan Aboussedra in January 
1989, without informing him of the charges against him or showing him a 
formal arrest warrant.82 Dr. Aboussedra did not appear in court until 2004.83 
The Working Group found his detention during that fifteen-year period to 
be arbitrary for lack of legal justification.84 
An individual has a right to know the charges against him in a language 
that he or she understands. In Elöd Tóásó v. Bolivia (2011), the Working 
Group found that Elöd Tóásó’s rights had been violated when the Bolivian 
government failed to inform him without delay in his own language (Hun-
garian) of the charges of which he was accused.85
Detention in violation of domestic law is similarly unjustified.86 The 
Working Group does however acknowledge the customary rule that arrest 
in flagrante delicto may be made without warrant.87 
Finally, detention must be based on “specific acts justifying . . . arrest.”88 
A person may not be detained due to the alleged threat he or she poses or 
a supposed risk that the individual may commit an offense in the future.89
2. Continued Detention after Court-Ordered Release or Dismissal of 
Charges is Manifestly Arbitrary
In May 2004, the High Administrative Court in Egypt issued an order for 
Tarek Abelmoujoud Al Zumer’s release, but the Ministry of Interior kept Mr. 
Al Zumer in custody.90 Detention based on an administrative order despite 
 82. Dr. Mohamed Hassan Aboussedra v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/21/Add.1 at 5 (2009).
 83. Id. ¶ 5.
 84. Id. at 6, ¶¶ 10–11. 
 85. Elöd Tóásó v. Bolivia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 63/2011, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/63, ¶ 42 (2011). In this instance, the Hungarian con-
sulate had even offered to assist in communicating with Mr. Tóásó. Id.
 86. Ernest Bennett et al v. Haiti, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 112, ¶ 6 (2000). Ernest Bennett, seventy-three-year-old ex-father-
in-law of former Haitian President Jean-Claude Duvalier, was arrested for embezzling 
government funds. Id. Under Haitian law, individuals aged sixty-five or older cannot be 
detained except in cases of violent crime, making Bennett’s detention arbitrary whether 
the charges against him were valid or not. Id.
 87. See Report on the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on its visit to Brazil, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/27/48/Add.3 at ¶ 39 (30 June 2014). Ernest Bennett et al. v. Haiti, Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 112 (2000).
 88. Iván Fernándex Depestre v. Cuba, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/WGAD/2014/9 at 4, ¶ 24 (2014).
 89. Id.
 90. Tarek Abdelmoujoud Al Zumer v. Egypt, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 3/2011, U.N. Doc A/HRC/WGAD/2011/3, ¶¶ 5–7 (2011). 
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a court order for a detainee’s release is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.91 
Similarly, detention due to a failure to execute a court-ordered release is 
manifestly arbitrary, for lack of legal justification.92 Detention is similarly 
arbitrary if it continues after a court-ordered dismissal of charges against 
the detainee; such detention cannot be justified by rearrest for the same 
offense, even if new charges are filed.93 In the event of detention without 
warrant, charge, or trial, government acknowledgement of the detention is 
not necessary for it to be found arbitrary.94 
3. Detention after Completion of Sentence or Amnesty is Arbitrary
Detention is arbitrary if it extends beyond the term of a commuted sentence.95 
In 2006, Hassine Bettaibi was sentenced in the United Arab Emirates to six 
months in prison for issuing a bad check.96 He was arrested in Algiers on 
April 14, 2011, and extradited to the United Arab Emirates on July 28, 2011.97 
Despite having completed his six-month sentence by October 15, 2011, Mr. 
Bettaibi remained in detention when the Working Group adopted an opinion 
on his case (November 21, 2012).98 Mr. Bettaibi’s detention after October 
15, 2011, was considered arbitrary because it was “clearly impossible to 
 91. Mahmoud Abdelsamed Kassem v. Egypt, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 7/2011, U.N. Doc A/HRC/WGAD/2011/7, ¶¶ 16–17 (2011) (“The Working Group 
reiterates its opinion that, in such cases, no legal basis can be invoked to justify the 
detention, least of all an administrative order issued to circumvent a judicial decision 
ordering the release.”).
 92. Bennett v. Haiti, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 112, ¶ 43. Port-Au-Prince Chief 
Prosecutor Jean-Auguste Brutus failed to sign and execute a court-ordered release, is-
sued upon a judicial finding of insufficient evidence. Id. Failure to release Bennett also 
violated Haiti’s 1987 Constitution. Id. The Working Group stated that “the detention of 
Ernest Bennett, Antony C.J. Charles and Evans François, who are still in custody despite 
a release order issued by an examining magistrate, the deprivation of liberty is also 
arbitrary because it manifestly cannot be justified on any legal basis (Category I).” Id. 
¶ 44.
 93. Sen, Editor-in-Chief of the Nepalese-language weekly Janadesh, was arrested under 
the Public Security Act after interviewing a presumed leader of the Maoist insurgency. 
Id. ¶ 4. Krishna Sen v. Nepal, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4.2002/77/Add.1 at 45, (2001). The Supreme Court of Nepal ordered Sen’s release, 
but his release papers were forged, and he was re-arrested on new charges of carry-
ing illegal weapons. Id. ¶¶ 5–7. The Working Group found that “[T]he rearrest and 
detention of a person in violation of a judicial decision—in this case a Supreme Court 
decision—constitutes a deprivation of liberty that manifestly cannot be justified on any 
legal basis and is therefore, by definition, of an arbitrary nature.” Id. ¶ 10(ii).
 94. Sen was ultimately transferred into secret detention, presumably at Siraha prison. In 
addition to finding arbitrary detention under category I, the Working Group also ruled 
that secret detention is in itself arbitrary under category III, gross violations of the right 
to fair trial. Id. ¶ 10(iii).
 95. Hassine Bettaibi v. United Arab Emirates, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 61/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/61 at ¶ 2(a) (2012).
 96. Id. ¶ 7.
 97. Id. ¶¶ 4–6.
 98. Id. ¶ 13.
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invoke any legal basis justifying it.”99 Detention is also arbitrary if it follows 
the reinstatement of a previously commuted sentence,100 or if it continues 
after an amnesty decree.101 Additionally, detention cannot continue after 
the end of an individual’s sentence based on a suspicion that the individual 
might reoffend or for the public’s protection.102 
4. Detention Without Charge or Arraignment in Competent Court at 
Guantánamo Bay of Prisoners Arrested in the Afghanistan Intervention 
but denied Prisoner-of-War status, Constitutes Arbitrary Detention
Mourad Benchellali, Khaled Ben Mustafa, and Nizar Sassi, all French na-
tionals, were arrested along with Hamed Abderrahaman Ahmed, a Spanish 
citizen, during the United States-led military intervention in Afghanistan in 
the fall of 2001.103 Mr. Benchellali and Mr. Ahmed were reportedly arrested 
by Pakistani forces in Pakistan, and Mr. Mustafa and Mr. Sassi by US forces 
in Afghanistan.104 All four eventually arrived at the US base in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba.105 They were denied Prisoner-of-War status and detained for more 
than a year without formal charges or arraignment in a competent court.106 
These four detainees were among the estimated 780 individuals who were 
held by the United States in Guantánamo Bay as enemy combatants based 
on their alleged terrorist activities directed at the United States.107 
 99. Id.
100. James Mawdsley v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 124, ¶ 14(b) (2000). Mawdsley, a British citizen, was arrested 
in September 1997, for spray-painting pro-democracy graffiti, and was deported. Id. ¶ 
6. Mawdsley returned to Myanmar in April 1998, whereupon he was arrested both for 
playing pro-democracy songs on a tape recorder, and for entering the country illegally. 
Id. ¶ 7. This time Mawdsley received a five-year sentence, but after serving 99 days it 
was commuted and he was again deported. Id. Mawdsley returned to Myanmar again 
in August 1999, and was again arrested (this time for distributing pro-democracy leaf-
lets). Id. Mawdsley was sentenced to five years under § 13(1) of the Immigration Act 
and seven years under § 17 of the Printing and Publishing Act, and his prior five-year 
sentence, previously commuted, was reinstated for a total sentence of seventeen years. 
Id. ¶ 11. The reinstatement of a previously commuted sentence was found to constitute 
arbitrary detention under category I. Id. ¶ 14(a). 
101. Janie Model v. United Arab Emirates, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 42, ¶ 10 (2004). The Working Group found that detention after 
amnesty was not justified, even in view of a pending civil action, but distinguished 
from a case in which payment of a fine was a precondition to release, and in which no 
amnesty had been declared. Id. ¶ 7, citing George Atkinson v. United Arab Emirates, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1 at 3 (2002).
102. Mr. A v. New Zealand, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
WGAD/2015/21, ¶ 23 (2015); see also supra part III.A.7. 
103. Mourad Benchellali v. United States of America, supra note 9, at 33, ¶ 5.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 34, ¶¶ 6–7.
107. The Guantánamo Docket, n.y. times, 17 Nov. 2015, available at http://projects.nytimes.
com/guantanamo/detainees (Benchellali, Sassi, and Mustafa appear on the list of detainees 
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The four detainees were visited by the Red Cross and, through that 
agency, were able to write letters home, but were otherwise cut off from 
communication, including communication with counsel.108 In 2003, the 
Working Group found their detention to be arbitrary under Category I, for lack 
of legal justification.109 According to documents obtained by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) through a Freedom of Information Act request, 
the United States Department of State issued a formal written response to 
the Working Group disputing the Working Group’s opinion, asserting that 
the matter was outside the competence of the Working Group because the 
four detainees were enemy combatants and, therefore, the conditions of 
their detention were the subject of the Geneva Conventions and the law of 
armed conflict.110 Within the following two years, the four detainees were 
transferred to custody in France and Spain, the countries in which they 
maintained citizenship.111 During that same two-year period, however, over 
two hundred detainees were transferred out of Guantánamo Bay to other 
countries and there is no indication that the transfer of these four detainees 
was necessarily a response to the Working Group’s findings.112 Nonetheless, 
the foundational principles of the Working Group’s opinions—that states may 
not detain individuals, even suspected terrorists, without offering them basic 
due process rights—have continued to influence the public debate over the 
treatment of Guantánamo Bay detainees. 
As of the publication of this article, most of the detainees have been 
transferred to other countries, but about a hundred detainees remain in 
custody at Guantánamo Bay.113 A public debate continues over whether the 
alleged dangers posed by the detainees justified the United States holding 
them for protracted periods without arraignment or charges.114 Through its 
   in the N.Y. Times “Docket,” while the surname Abderrahaman does not appear, possibly 
because Mr. Abderrahaman was identified by another name or because he was one of 
the detainees who remained unidentified in the N.Y. Times project). 
108. Mourad Benchellali v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.2004/3/Add.1 at 33, ¶ 6 (2003).
109. Id. at 34–35, ¶¶ 9–12. Hamed Abderrahaman was transferred to Spanish custody in 
February 2004, Mourad Benchellali and Nizar Sassi were released into French custody 
in July 2004, and Khald Ben Mustafa was released to French custody in March 2005. 
See Mourad Benchellali, Detainees in Despair, n.y. times, 14 June 2006, at A23, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/opinion/14benchellali.html; News Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Transfer of French Detainees Complete, 27 July 2004, available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20041031103938/http://www.defense.gov/releases/2004/
nr20040727-1062.html.
110. Cable from U.S. Dep’t of State to Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (3 Aug. 2003), 
released to ACLU 23 Dec. 2004, available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org.
111. The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 107.
112. National Public Radio, Q&A About Guantanamo Bay and the Detainees, 23 June 2005, 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4715916.
113. The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 107.
114. See, e.g., Margaret Hazuka, Don’t Forget Guantánamo: The Legacy of the “War on Ter-
ror,” Torture, and Indefinite Detention, HArv. C.r.-C.l. l. rev. (2014); Gabrielle Banks, 
Guantánamo Bay Legal Issues Stubbornly Persist, pittsBurgH post-gAzette, 10 June 2013.
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investigative procedures, the Working Group reached a definitive answer 
to that question at least with respect to four of the detainees, concluding 
that their detention violated international law.115 It remains to be seen what 
impact the Working Group’s opinion will have on the debate over prolonged 
detention as a counterterrorism strategy generally, and the degree to which 
states may continue to suspend the due process rights of the accused when 
suspected terrorists are involved. In any event, the Working Group’s deter-
mination, now in the public domain, may inform decisions on such matters 
in the future.
5. Civil Claims are Insufficient Justification for Arbitrary Detention
Detention solely because of an alleged civil debt, without warrant, charges, 
trial, or other access to legal process, is arbitrary for lack of legal justifica-
tion.116 The same is true in the case of ship-board detention based on a 
maritime claim.117 
6. Participation of Non-State Actors does Not Absolve a Government 
of Responsibility for Tolerating an Illegal Situation
In Timchenko et al. v. Nigeria (1999), the detention was carried out by 
both military personnel and private commercial agents of an oil company, 
Lonestar Nigeria.118 The Working Group ruled that the participation of non-
state actors did not absolve the Nigerian Government of responsibility for 
knowingly tolerating an illegal situation, and for failure to carry out the 
court-ordered release of the remaining detainees.119 Timchenko must, how-
ever, be distinguished from Olga Rodas et al. v. Colombia (1999), in which 
hostage-taking by an illegal paramilitary group fell outside the Working 
Group’s competence.120 
115. Mourad Benchellali v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.2004/3/Add.1 at 33, 35, ¶ 12 (2003). 
116. Jaweed Al-Ghussein v. Palestinian Authority, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.2003/8/Add.1 at 46, ¶¶ 13–14 (2001). See also ICCPR, supra note 
10, at 56, art. 11.
117. Volodymyr Timchenko et al. v. Nigeria, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 24 (1999). The Dubai Valour was seized in Sapele, Nigeria, 
in August 1997, on a disputed civil claim of US $17 million. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Despite a 
release order issued by the Nigerian Federal High Court in Lagos, some crew members 
were detained for more than two years. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
118. Id. ¶¶ 7–10.
119. Id. ¶¶ 18(b).
120. Olga Rodas v. Colombia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 7, ¶ 5 (1999).
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7. Purported Justifications of Protective Custody, Psychiatric 
Detention, and Rehabilitation do not Preclude a Finding of Arbitrary 
Detention
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested without 
formal charges on 31 May 2003, allegedly as a threat to Myanmar state 
security.121 Ms. Suu Kyi was held against her will in a military guesthouse 
without access to counsel or family for over a year.122 Despite the govern-
ment’s claim that Ms. Suu Kyi was being held in protective custody, for 
her own safety, following allegedly unlawful and violent actions of her 
supporters, the Working Group nonetheless found her detention arbitrary 
under category I.123 
Similarly, involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital without legal 
provisions governing institutionalization amounts to arbitrary detention.124 In 
2009, two former members of the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
were categorized as “surrendees” under Sri Lanka’s Emergency Regulation 
No. 22 and placed in a rehabilitation center.125 The individuals were later 
transferred to a detention center, then a prison, spending over two years in 
detention.126 Throughout that period, neither individual was ever formally 
charged.127 The Working Group found that indefinite detention in a rehabili-
tation center without judicial oversight or review is arbitrary detention.128
121. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 47, ¶¶ 5–6 (2004).
122. Id. ¶ 6.
123. Id. ¶¶ 9, 15–16. The Working Group had found Suu Kyi’s detention to be arbitrary, in 
2002, but had issued the opinion after what ultimately proved to be a temporary release. 
Aung San Suu Kyi v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4.2003/8/Add.1 at 50, ¶ 19 (2002).
124. Wang Wanxing v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 7/2003, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1 at 39 (2003). Wang Wanxing was involuntarily com-
mitted to a psychiatric hospital after attempting to unfurl a banner in commemoration 
of the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square. Id. ¶¶ 6, 10–12. To the extent that Wanxing’s 
psychiatric institutionalization was against his will and carried out on closed premises 
which he was not allowed to leave, it constituted detention. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. The Work-
ing Group found this detention to be arbitrary because the hospital in question was 
run by the Public Security Bureau, there was no legal provisions governing Wanxwing’s 
institutionalization, and he was prohibited from contacting the press or pro-democracy 
advocates while on leave. Id. ¶¶ 13–15.
125. Pathmanathan Balasingam, et al. v. Sri Lanka, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 26/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/26, ¶ 27 (2012).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 29. The Working Group noted that detention used for “educational purposes” 
still qualifies as detention and requires the right to effective remedy and due process 
guarantees in the EDHR and ICCPR. Id. ¶ 26. According to the Working Group, any 
restriction on liberty requires a proportionality review to consider whether measures 
taken were legal, “suitable, necessary and proportionate.” Id. 
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8. Non bis in Idem
The principle of non bis in idem (i.e., double jeopardy)129 is illustrated by 
Mohammed Salim v. Pakistan.130 Mr. Salim was arrested in June 1998, for 
alleged involvement in the murder of three Pakistani police officers.131 Mr. 
Salim was tried by a military court in Karachi and sentenced to death.132 
His conviction was overturned in January 1999, due to lack of evidence, 
and in February 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan abolished the military 
court system that tried him, voiding all of its convictions.133 Nonetheless, Mr. 
Salim was rearrested in May 1999, and charged with the same offense.134 
The Working Group ruled Mr. Salim’s detention arbitrary because there is 
no legal justification for violating the principle of non bis in idem.135 In 
a Peruvian case, shoemaker/bricklayer Marco Antonio Sánchez Narváez 
was charged with terrorism, but he was eventually acquitted for lack of 
evidence.136 He was then retried in a military court for treason.137 In 2000, 
the Working Group found the military retrial violated the principle of non 
bis in idem and “automatically conferred an arbitrary character” to Mr. 
Narváez’s detention.138 
b. Category II: Deprivation of Liberty Resulting from the Exercise of 
Human Rights
The Working Group has stated in numerous opinions that detention for the 
exercise of human rights is arbitrary, even if the detention is justified by 
domestic laws.139 The Working Group considers detention arbitrary if it was 
129. Literally, “Not twice for the same thing.” Non bis in idem, BlACk’s lAW diCtionAry (8th 
ed. 2004).
130. Mohammed Salim v. Pakistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
6/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 64, ¶ 8 (2000).
131. Id. ¶ 5.
132. Id.
133. Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
134. Id. ¶ 7.
135. The Working Group noted that non bis in idem is both a general principle of law, and 
is found in Article XIII of the Constitution of Pakistan. Id. ¶ 8. The Working Group also 
found that Salim, who was fourteen years old at the time of his arrest, had been detained 
in violation of the Beijing Rules (the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice). Mohammed Salim v. Pakistan, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 6/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 64, ¶¶ 
5, 9 (2000).
136. Marco Sánchez Narváez v. Peru, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
27/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 131, ¶¶ 5–8 (2000).
137. Id. ¶ 9. 
138. Id. ¶¶ 14–16.
139. See, e.g., Nabeel Abdulrasool Rajab v. Bahrain, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 12/2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/12 at 9, ¶ 39 (2013); Le Cong 
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for an individual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of religion; freedom 
of opinion and expression; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; 
freedom of involvement in public affairs; or freedom of movement.140 Any 
domestic legal restrictions on guaranteed freedoms are “subject to a strict 
proportionality requirement.”141 A country cannot simply make “a vague 
and general reference to the interests of national security or public order, 
without being properly explained and documented.”142 The broad nature 
of a criminal law could “result in penalties being imposed . . . on persons 
who have merely exercised their legitimate right to freedom of opinion or 
expression.”143 
1. Freedom of Religion Incorporates the Right to Freedom of 
Association and the Peaceful Advocacy for Religious Freedom
Freedom of religion extends to the right to freedom of assembly with other 
members of that religion and the right to peacefully protest for religious 
rights.144 According to the Working Group, this right should be upheld against 
accusations that a religion (for example, Falun Gong in China) constitutes 
an evil cult organization that spreads superstition, deception, and heresy, as 
well as unsubstantiated allegations of killings145 and claims that the religion 
posed a threat to national security.146 The Working Group has determined 
   Dinh v. Vietnam, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 27/2012, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/27, ¶ 37 (2012); Yusmani Rafael Álaverez Esmori v. Cuba, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 23/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/
WGAD/2012/23 at 3, ¶ 13 (2012).
140. See UDHR, supra note 10, at 71, arts. 7, 10, 13–14, 18–19, 21; ICCPR, supra note 10, 
at 52, arts. 12, 18–19, 21–22, 25–27. 
141. Gulmira Imin v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29/2012, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/29, ¶ 27 (2012).
142. Id. (quoting Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2006/7, ¶43 (2006)).
143. Le Cong Dinh v. Vietnam, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
27/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/27, ¶ 38 (2012); see also Gulmira Imin v. 
China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29/2012, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/WGAD/2012/29, ¶ 18 (2012). In 2009, Gulmira Imin’s Uyghur-language website 
disseminated a video of clashes at a toy factory in China that resulted in the death of 
two Uyghur employees. Id. Ms. Imin was charged with “organizing the illegal trouble-
making activities and intentionally caused serious vandalism crime” and was sentenced 
to life imprisonment. Id. ¶ 19.The Working Group found that the Chinese government 
failed to “show in a sufficiently specific and individualized manner the precise nature 
of the threat posed by Ms. Imin, and the necessity and proportionality of her detention 
and subsequent.” Id. ¶ 33.
144. Li Chang v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/
Add.1, at 25, ¶¶ 6–7 (2000); see also Ma Chunling v. China, Working Group on Ar-
bitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2014/4, at 3–4, ¶¶ 18–24 (2014).
145. Li Chang v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/
Add.1, at 25, ¶ 6 (2000).
146. Yuhui Zhang v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/
Add.1, at 22, ¶¶ 5–6 (2000).
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that detention on charges of disrupting social order and illegal demonstra-
tions were similarly arbitrary in the absence of evidence that the specific 
practices in question were violent.147 The right to peaceful religious advocacy 
also extends to distributing a letter critical of government policies,148 hand-
ing out pamphlets,149 and non-violent demonstrations for the right to attend 
university while adhering to the Islamic dress code.150 
2. Freedom of the Press and Expression is Guaranteed against 
Arbitrary Detention
The rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press include not 
only the right to publish or broadcast, but also the right to be interviewed.151 
The right to freedom of expression includes the right to publish interviews 
with members of an armed opposition group without openly endorsing its 
activities.152 It also incorporates non-traditional media such as music,153 
dance,154 audio-visual expression,155 and activities beyond actual publica-
tion such as preparations to launch a journal supporting literary freedom.156 
Additionally, these freedoms extend to expressions and publications 
that may oppose official government policy.157 In 2012, the Working Group 
found that Thailand’s lèse majesté laws suppress the national dialogue and 
147. Chen Gang v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/
Add.1, at 43–44, ¶¶ 26–29 (2003); Li Ling and Pei Jilin v. China, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 8, ¶¶ 9, 16 (2003).
148. Thadeus Nguyen Van Ly v. Viet Nam, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, at 4, ¶¶ 7, 20 (2003).
149. Tran Van Luong v. Viet Nam, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 62, ¶¶ 5–7, 14 (1999).
150. Hüda Kaya v. Turkey, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/
Add.1, at 108, ¶¶ 5, 16 (2000).
151. For instance, on the Voice of America. Abbas Amir-Entezam v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 34, ¶ 5 
(2000).
152. Moti Biyya et al. v. Ethiopia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 75, ¶¶ 5–8, 11 (1999).
153. Pierre Roger (alias Lapiro) Lambo Sandjo (alias Mbanga) v. Cameroon, Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 32/2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/32, ¶¶ 
25–26 (2011). The Working Group ruled that Mr. Lapiro de Mbanga’s song criticizing 
the government, “Constipated Constitution,” was “simply a political statement,” and 
therefore his subsequent detention for inciting riots was arbitrary. Id.
154. Ngawang Choephel v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2000/4/Add.1 at 78, 79, ¶ 8 (1999).
155. Maksat Kakabaev v. Turkmenistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
5/2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/5, at 7, ¶ 45 (2013) (finding that the detention 
of two singers for appearing on foreign media violated their right to freedom of expres-
sion). 
156. Xue Deyun and Xiong Jinren v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 26, ¶¶ 5–9 (1999).
157. Somyot Prueksakasemsuk v. Thailand, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 35/2012, U.N. Doc A/HRC/WGAD/2012/35, ¶ 24 (2012).
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violate the right to freedom of opinion and expression.158 The Working 
Group has found similar laws that classify any criticisms of public officials 
as defamation to also violate an individual’s right to freedom of expression, 
noting that “the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression 
is particularly high in the circumstances of public debate in a democratic 
society concerning figures in public or political domain.”159
3. Security-Related Restrictions on the Right to Freedom of Expression 
Must Be Specifically Provided in Domestic Legislation, Absolutely 
Necessary in a Democratic Society, and Justified by the Need to 
Protect a Legitimate National Security Interest
Huang Qi v. China (2004) concerns a website, “Tianwang Web,” which 
published articles on the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.160 The 
Chinese government shut down the site, operated by Mr. Qi, but it reappeared 
with articles on the Falun Gong. Mr. Qi denied responsibility for relaunching 
the site, but was charged with attempts to undermine the socialist system of 
China and sentenced to five years in prison.161 The Working Group required 
that any such restriction on freedom of expression be specifically defined in 
domestic legislation, be absolutely necessary in a democratic society, and 
be justified by the need to protect a legitimate national security interest.162 
Mr. Qi’s detention was considered arbitrary because the Chinese government 
failed to explain adequately how the threat caused by Mr. Qi’s publications 
could have been so serious as to justify detention for the peaceful exercise 
of his right to freedom of expression.163 
Similarly, in 2010, Agnès Uwimana Nkusi, an editor of a bi-weekly 
independent newspaper in Rwanda, was arrested for publishing stories that 
criticized the Rwandan president and his government.164 Ms. Uwimana was 
convicted of several charges, including endangering national security and 
158. Id. ¶ 20. Lèse majesté laws are laws which penalize the expression or publication of 
criticisms of the king or royal family. Id.
159. Agnès Uwimana Nkusi v. Rwanda, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 25/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/25, ¶ 58 (2012).
160. Huang Qi v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2004, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 60, ¶ 7 (2004).
161. Proceedings were held in camera, in the Chengdu Intermediate Court of Sichuan. Id. ¶ 
9–11. Huang Qi also reported that he was beaten, but the Chinese government denied 
beating Huang Qi. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 14. The Working Group also found the detention arbitrary if the text of relevant 
penal legislation was not provided. Syamak Pourzand v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Work-
ing Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1 at 45–46, ¶¶ 7–9 
(2003).
163. Huang Qi v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2004, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 60, ¶ 14. Huang Qi was released from prison in June 
2005, but is now confined to his parents’ home, three hours from his wife and children 
in Chengdu. 
164. Agnès Uwimana Nkusi v. Rwanda, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 25/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/25, ¶¶ 3, 11 (2012). 
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denying genocide.165 In examining the Rwandan penal code’s definition of 
“endangering national security,” the Working Group stressed that any re-
strictions to an individual’s fundamental freedoms may not be overbroad.166 
The Working Group concluded that the content of the articles in question 
qualified as opinions and not as expressions intended to undermine the 
national security of Rwanda.167 
Freedom of expression can be abused if exercised in a violent manner; 
when advocating national, racial, or religious hatred; or when inciting others 
to commit serious crimes such as genocide.168 Conversely, membership in 
a society that does not advocate violence; war; national, racial, or religious 
hatred; or other practices prohibited under the Civil and Political Covenant, 
cannot justify detention.169 
4. Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Political Opinion are 
Protected against Arbitrary Detention with Release Conditioned on 
Renunciation
Detention may not be used to coerce renunciation of one’s religion. In Pa 
Tood et al. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic (2000), at least twenty-five 
Laotian Christian evangelists were arrested in the Savannakhet, Champassak, 
and Attapoeu provinces. The Laotian authorities offered them freedom if they 
signed a declaration renouncing Christianity.170 The Working Group found that 
the government’s actions constituted a violation of the rights to freedom of 
expression and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Articles 
9, 10, 18, and 19 of the Universal Declaration.171 The prohibition against 
detention conditioned on renunciation is extended to political opinion in 
Shahadeh et al. v. Syrian Arab Republic (2004).172 Similarly, release from 
arbitrary detention may not be conditioned on one’s promising not to register 
a new political party.173 
165. Id. ¶ 9. 
166. Id. ¶ 57.
167. Id.
168. Jigme Gyatso v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No 8/2000, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 67, ¶¶ 5–7, 15, 17 (2000).
169. Id. ¶ 16.
170. Pa Tood v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 26/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 127, ¶¶ 5–7 (2000). The 
detainees’ families were also driven from their village on the grounds that believers in 
Jesus were not allowed to settle there. Id. ¶ 8.
171. Id. ¶ 12. This finding was not defeated by the government’s counter-allegations of il-
legal contact with foreigners, and failure to follow the rules of the government and the 
Communist Party. Id. ¶ 11.
172. Mohammad Shahadeh v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 6/2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, at 39, ¶¶ 7, 12 (2004).
173. Unless the party has the aim or practice of engaging in propaganda for war or non-
peaceful assembly. Wang Youcai v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 21/1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 85, 86, 88, ¶¶ 6, 18–19 
(2003).
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5. Freedom of Expression and Association Incorporates the Right to 
Peacefully Advocate for other Human Rights
Freedom of expression as guaranteed under the Universal Declaration, Articles 
18 and 19, extends to peaceful advocacy for other rights, such as freedom of 
speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion.174 Peaceful advocacy 
includes the right to perform academic research on minority groups,175 the 
right to proclaim a hunger strike,176 and the right to advocate for individual 
victims of human rights abuses.177 It is a violation of international human 
rights standards to characterize specific allegations of human rights abuses 
as state secrets for which disclosure would make one criminally liable.178 
Freedom of association incorporates the right to associate with other 
peaceful advocates, including human rights defenders, journalists, writers, 
leaders of opposition political movements, dissident social leaders, and trade 
union leaders.179 Peaceful advocacy of economic rights, such as workers’ 
rights, is also protected.180
The Working Group applies a higher standard of review to the detention 
of individuals considered to be human rights defenders.181 For example, in 
2012, the Working Group undertook an intense review following Ethiopia’s 
detention of Eskinder Nega, a known publicist, blogger, and human rights 
worker.182 The Working Group’s analysis found that Ethiopia’s definitions of 
174. Liu Xiaobo v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 17/1999, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 72, ¶¶ 5, 9 (1999).
175. Tohti Tunyaz v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 7/2001, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 50, ¶¶ 16–19, 23 (2000). Taunyaz was charged both 
with disclosing state secrets and with collecting materials for the purpose of publishing 
a book aimed at ethnic separation. Id. ¶ 11.
176. Khemais Ksila v. Tunisia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 5/1999, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 37, 38, 39, ¶¶ 10, 16 (2000).
177. Li Hai v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 19/1999, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 78, 80, ¶¶ 5–7, 13 (1999). Freedom of expression 
also protects peaceful advocacy for individuals accused of terrorist attacks. Makhbuba 
Kasymova v. Uzbekistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 32/2000, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 10, ¶¶ 5–6, 10 (1999).
178. Rebiya Kadeer v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 30/2000, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 5, ¶ 10 (2000).
179. Nelson Aguiar Ramírez v. Cuba, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
9/2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1 at 47, 52, 54–56, ¶¶ 6, 14–16, 26 (2003). The 
case involved seventy-nine members of the Varela Project, which the Cuban government 
characterized as conceived, funded, and directed by the United States. Id. ¶ 15; see 
also Leonardo Miguel Bruzón Ávila v. Cuba, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 17/2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1, at 87, ¶ 7 (2003).
180. Yao Fuxin v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2002, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1, at 3, ¶¶ 5–7 (2003); Liu Xianbin and Li Bifeng v. 
China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 12/2003, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2004/3/Add.1 at 67, ¶¶ 5–8, 10–11, 23 (2003).
181. Eskinder Nega v. Ethiopia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 62/2012, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/62, ¶ 39 (2012). 
182. Id.
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criminal offenses were overly broad and that detaining Mr. Nega constituted 
arbitrary detention.183
6. Detention for Pro-Democracy Views or Participation in a Peaceful 
Independence Movement is Arbitrary
Liu Xianbin, a leading member of the China Democratic Party, was sen-
tenced to thirteen years imprisonment in 1999 for “incitement to subvert 
State power.”184 Following his release in 2008, Mr. Xianbin continued his 
activism and published articles on human rights and democracy.185 In 2010, 
Mr. Xianbin was arrested again for the same offense as before and was later 
found guilty of the charges.186 The Working Group found Mr. Xianbin’s deten-
tion arbitrary because it was based solely upon the peaceful exercise of his 
right to freedom of opinion and expression.187 In a 2004 case concerning 
Georgia, the Working Group found that detention intended to intimidate an 
election monitor is similarly arbitrary.188 
In Filep Jacob Semuel Karma v. Indonesia (2011), Mr. Karma was arrested 
for participating in a symbolic ceremony related to the Papuan independence 
movement.189 The Working Group found that Mr. Karma’s detention, based 
solely on his participation in a peaceful flag raising ceremony, was arbitrary.190 
In 2000, the Working Group similarly found that China engaged in arbitrary 
detention of peaceful protestors demonstrating for Tibetan independence.191 
The Working Group noted that defining peaceful protests as an offense in 
itself contravened Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration.192 
183. Id. ¶ 40.
184. Liu Xianbin v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 23/2011, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/23, ¶ 4 (2011). The Working Group found Liu Xianbin’s 
1999 detention arbitrary. Id.; see also Liu Xianbin and Li Bifeng v. China, Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 12/2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1, at 67, 
¶¶ 5–8, 10–11, 23 (2003).
185. Id. ¶ 5.
186. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
187. Id. ¶¶ 24–26.
188. Giorgi Mshvenieradz v. Georgia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
2/2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, at 28, ¶¶ 9–10 (2004).
189. Filep Jacob Semuel Karma v. Indonesia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 48/2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/48, ¶ 5 (2011).
190. Id. ¶ 24. The Indonesian government did not respond to these allegations.
191. Ngawang Sandrol v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 28/2000, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 134, ¶¶ 13–17 (2000).
192. Id. ¶ 15. The Working Group also found arbitrary detention in response to raising the 
Tibetan flag and shouting slogans. Phuntsok Legmon and Namdrol v. China, Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 19/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, 
at 99, ¶¶ 8–9 (2000).
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7. Detention for Violation of Politically Imposed Travel Restrictions is 
Arbitrary
In U Tun Win et al. v. Myanmar (1999), a number of National League for 
Democracy office holders were detained during the night of 25 June 1998, 
and only released after pledging not to leave their respective municipali-
ties.193 The Working Group found the actions of the Myanmar government 
constituted a restriction of liberty and that any detention based upon viola-
tion of that restriction was arbitrary.194 
8. Re-Education through Labor is Arbitrary Detention if Ordered in 
Response to Peaceful Exercise of Fundamental Freedoms
The Working Group addressed the issue of re-education through labor in 
Zhou Guoqiang v. China (1998).195 Mr. Guoqiang was sentenced to three 
years of re-education for disturbing the public order after selling t-shirts with 
antigovernment slogans.196 The Working Group found that Mr. Guoqiang’s 
deprivation of freedom constituted arbitrary detention, violating his right to 
nonviolent expression.197 
C. Category III: Deprivation of Liberty Resulting from Violations of the 
Right to fair Trial
Even when an underlying basis for an individual’s detention exists and that 
basis does not violate international standards, the Working Group may still 
find the detention arbitrary based on a violation of the individual’s right to 
fair trial. According to Article 9, Paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Civil and Political 
Covenant, anyone deprived of his or her liberty has a right to be “brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise ju-
dicial power”; a right to a trial “within a reasonable time”; and a right to 
have a court decide “without delay on the lawfulness of his detention.”198 
Article 14 of the Covenant also provides that an individual has the right to a 
“fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
193. U Tun Win et al. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 3/1999, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1 at 32 (1999).
194. Id. ¶ 11.
195. Zhou Guoqiang v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 30/1998, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, at 21 (1998).
196. Id. ¶ 5.
197. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. Because re-education was applied to “minor” offenders who were not 
required to be formally prosecuted, the Working Group also found the practice arbitrary 
under category III, gross violation of the right to fair trial. Id. ¶ 9, citing the Working 
Group’s China visit report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/44/Add.2.
198. ICCPR, supra note 10, at 52, art. 9(3–4).
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established by the law,” as well as the right to a presumption of innocence 
until proven guilty and other minimum due process guarantees.199
Detention may be considered arbitrary even if the individual was not 
“‘convicted as a result’ of the violations of his rights.”200 In considering vio-
lations of an individual’s right to fair trial, the Working Group determines 
whether the violations were of “such gravity as to give the deprivation of 
liberty an arbitrary character.”201
1. Irregular Detention Locations
When an individual is apprehended, he or she need not be held in an of-
ficial detention center to be considered detained for the purposes of the 
Working Group’s mandate. In the opinions discussed below, the Working 
Group has concluded that deprivation of freedom is considered detention 
even in irregular locations.
a. Secret Detention is in itself a Violation of the Right to Fair 
Trial, but Brief Periods of Incommunicado Detention may 
be Lawfully Authorized in Exceptional Circumstances such 
as Terrorism and Conspiracy
In Zhou Yung Jun v. China (2011), the Working Group held that secret 
detention is “irreconcilably in violation of international human rights law, 
including during states of emergency and armed conflict.”202 Under Mikel 
Egibar Mitxelena v. Spain (1999), however, brief periods of up to three days 
of incommunicado detention may be authorized under exceptional circum-
stances, as specified in lawful regulation, when considered indispensable by 
a judicial or other authority in order to maintain security and good order.203 
199. Id. art. 14 (1–3). Article 14 (3) includes an individual’s right to be promptly informed 
of charges in a language the individual understands, the right to “adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his 
own choosing,” the right to be present at one’s own trial and to participate in one’s own 
defense, the right to examine witnesses, the right to an interpreter for trial proceedings, 
and the right “not to be compelled to . . . confess guilt.” Id.
200. Dmitri Pavlov v. Azerbaijan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
22/2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/22, ¶ 45 (2011).
201. Id.
202. Zhou Yung Jun v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29/2011, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/29, at 5, ¶ 30 (2011).
203. Mikel Egibar Mitxelena v. Spain, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
26/1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 9, ¶ 10 (1999) (citing the ICCPR, art. 
9, ¶ 3, the Working Group found a 72-hour time period to be within the bounds of 
what can be considered “prompt”). In case involving extremely serious terrorism-related 
charges, a forty-eight-hour extension of this period, under judicial control and with 
medical supervision to avoid torture, was not considered to constitute arbitrary deten-
tion. Id. ¶ 9.
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b. House Arrest Constitutes a Qualified Deprivation of Liberty 
if in Closed and Locked Premises which Cannot be Left 
Without Authorization
A formal prison environment is not necessary for a finding of arbitrary 
detention.204 House arrest may constitute a sufficient deprivation of liberty, 
but only if the person concerned is placed in closed premises that cannot 
be left without authorization.205 The Working Group has ruled that it will 
determine on a case by case basis whether the characteristics of a given 
instance of house arrest amount to a form of detention.206 For example, in 
2007, after Myanmar’s authorities prevented opposition leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi from leaving her home in Rangoon and having any contact with 
the outside world, the Working Group determined the situation to be house 
arrest.207 The Working Group also determined that house arrest was taking 
place when Chinese security agents prevented people from entering the 
home of Liu Xia, the wife of democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo. The Chinese 
authorities only allowed her to leave the house for short escorted trips; they 
also cut off her access to telephones and the Internet.208
c. Administrative Detention that is Penal Because of its 
Purpose, Character, or Severity is Deprivation of Liberty 
Requiring Guarantees of a Fair Trial
The Working Group considers any detention that is criminal in nature, even 
if it is classified as administrative under domestic law, as requiring the in-
ternational guarantees of a right to fair trial.209 In November 2003, Pakistan 
deported thirteen students to Malaysia, where they were immediately de-
tained as a threat to national security under Sections 73(1) and 73(8) of the 
204. Jaweed Al-Ghussein v. Palestinian Authority, Opinion No. 31/2001, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1 at 44 (2001).
205. Thich Huyen Quang v. Viet Nam, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
4/2001, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 43, ¶¶ 8–10 (2001).
206. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Deliberation No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/
CN. 4/1993/24, at 9, ¶ 20 (1993).
207. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 2/2007, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4/Add.1 at 56 (2007).
208. Liu Xia v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 16/2011, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/16 at 2, ¶ 7 (2011). The Working Group references a 1996 
ruling by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in which the 
court determined that house arrest constituted detention under international law and was 
subject to the same guarantees as detention in a prison facility. Id. ¶ 16 (citing ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Blaškic´, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Motion of the Defence 
Filed Pursuant to Rule 64 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3 Apr. 1996, ¶¶ 
19–24). 
209. Umar Farooq Shaikh v. India, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
45/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/45 at 3, ¶ 15 (2012).
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Internal Security Act of 1960.210 The Act allows detention for up to sixty days 
without trial, extendible by the Home Minister indefinitely.211 The Working 
Group found such administrative detention, despite being in conformity 
with domestic law, to constitute a serious contravention of international 
norms guaranteeing the right to fair trial.212 In a 2002 case involving the 
United States, the Working Group similarly found the prolonged fourteen 
month administrative detention of an alleged “material witness” arbitrary.213 
In ’Abla Sa’adat et al. v. Israel (2004), the Working Group issued a finding 
of arbitrary detention despite Israel’s express derogations from its Civil and 
Political Covenant responsibilities under a prolonged “state of emergency.”214 
2. Unnecessary Detention During the Judicial Process
As a general rule, a person awaiting trial should not be held in custody, 
although release can be subject to conditions, such as bail, to guarantee ap-
pearance at trial.215 The Working Group provided that one instance in which 
pretrial detention may be allowed is “in the case of international crimes or, 
in national legal systems, of extremely grave crimes.”216 The Working Group, 
however, supports the standard of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which indicates that the severity of the crime is only relevant when the facts 
of the case demonstrate that the release of the detainee threatens public 
order. Furthermore, a detention only remains legitimate if the individual 
210. The students were accused of being groomed for leadership in the Jemaah Islamiyah. 
Muhammad Radzi bin Abdul Razak v. Malaysia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, at 49, ¶ 6 (2004).
211. Id.
212. Id. ¶ 12.
213. Ayub Ali Khan and Azmath Jaweed v. United States of America, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 21/2002, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1, at 20, 
21–22, ¶¶ 14–17 (2002); Mahmoud Mubarak Ahmad v. Egypt, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1 at 68, 69, 
¶¶ 9–10 (1999). See also Özgür v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Opinion No. 33/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 13, ¶ 12 (2000) 
(finding Category III violation for detention without warrant, charge, or trial).
214. ’Abla Sa’adat et al. v. Israel, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
3/2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, at 30, ¶¶ 31, 34–35 (2004). The United Na-
tions Human Rights Committee found Israel’s “sweeping measures” to extend beyond 
what would be permissible even under the Covenant, art. 4, ¶ 1. Id., citing U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/78/ISR, ¶ 12; see also ICCPR, supra ICCPR, note 10, at 52, art. 9(1) (“In time 
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation . . . the States Parties to the 
present ICCPR may take measures derogating from their obligations.” ).
215. Azharul Islam v. Bangladesh, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
66/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/66, ¶ 47 (2012). See also U.N. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8: Right to Liberty and Security of Persons, 
¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (30 June 1982) [hereinafter HRC GC 8] (stating that 
“pretrial detention should be an exception”). 
216. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Legal analysis of allegations against 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Deliberation No. 6 U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14, ¶ 23 (2000).
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continues to be a threat to public order.217 The prosecution has the burden 
of convincing the court not to release the individual on bail.218
Since detention while awaiting trial should be the exception rather than 
the rule, any individual deprived of her liberty should “promptly” be brought 
before a judicial authority.219 “Promptly” should be considered to mean within 
the first few days following detention.220 In Santhathevan Ganesharatnam 
v. Sri Lanka (2013), the Working Group found that Mr. Ganesharatnam’s 
pretrial detention of thirty months far exceeded the acceptable reasonable 
time period.221 Additionally, the Working Group noted that Sri Lanka’s laws, 
which allowed up to eighteen months detention without charge, represented 
a prima facie case of arbitrary detention. The Working Group warned Sri 
Lankan authorities that all officials are responsible for preventing arbitrary 
detention and that gross violations of an individual’s right to a fair trial could 
amount to a crime against humanity.222 In the case of armed insurrection, 
however, pretrial detention of sixteen months after charges had been filed 
did not necessarily constitute arbitrary detention.223
217. Azharul Islam v. Bangladesh, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
66/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/66, ¶ 49 (2012) (quoting European Court of 
Human Rights, Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, Judgment of 27 Aug. 1992, ¶ 91, 
(1992)).
218. Azharul Islam v. Bangladesh, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
66/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/66, ¶ 50 (2012). Bangladesh’s pre-trial deten-
tion of Messrs. Islam, Azam, and Ali—who were all charged with violating Bangladesh’s 
International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973—amounted to arbitrary detention. Id. ¶ 54. The 
Working Group came to this conclusion because the prosecution did not meet its burden 
of justifying an exception to the rule. Id. ¶¶ 53–54. The Working Group rejected the 
comparison of the Bangladeshi domestic international war crimes tribunal to international 
criminal tribunals—where the burden is to the accused to show why he or she qualifies 
for pre-trial release—because, unlike international tribunals, the Bangladeshi tribunal 
had the power to execute arrest warrants and to rearrests the individual if needed. Id. 
¶ 51.
219. Crispin Mumango v. Burundi, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
18/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/18, ¶ 13 (2012).
220. Id.
221. Santhathevan Ganesharatnam v. Sri Lanka, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 9/2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/9, ¶¶ 25–28 (2013).
222. Id. ¶¶34–40. See also Gunasundaram Jayasundaram v. Sri Lanka, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 38/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/38 ¶ 33 
(2012); Pathmanathan Balasingam et al. v. Sri Lanka, Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion, Opinion No. 26/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/26 ¶ 25 (2012); Jegasothy 
Thamotharampillai et al. v. Sri Lanka, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 49/2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/49 (2011).
223. The Working Group indicated that the period of detention between charge and trial 
might be unreasonable, but did not find arbitrary detention. Mohammed Abdillahi God 
v. Djibouti, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 14/2002, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1 at 98–99, ¶¶ 8, 17–18 (2002). A one-year detention without 
formal charges was found arbitrary in a case involving freedom of political expression 
on the web, under category II and category III. Di Liu v. China, Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 25/2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 23, ¶¶ 
5–9 (2003).
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3. The Right to Legal Counsel is Guaranteed
The Working Group consistently affirms the right to counsel.224 Access to 
counsel includes the right to communicate with a lawyer promptly following 
arrest.225 Additionally, individuals should be able to communicate confiden-
tially with their lawyers.226 In Turkey’s prosecution of the alleged plotters of 
a military coup in 2010—the so-called “Sledgehammer” cases—the govern-
ment placed microphones throughout the courtroom, enabling its agents to 
listen to the private conversations between defendants and their attorneys.227 
The right to counsel also includes freedom of choice of counsel.228 
The right to access counsel can be violated if attorneys are discouraged by 
government authorities from representing a specific individual. In Belarus, 
the first attorney representing Andrei Sannikov (a detained opposition politi-
cian and civil rights activist) was disbarred after publically raising concerns 
regarding the treatment of his client.229 The Working Group found that this 
act violated Mr. Sannikov’s right to effective legal assistance.230
It may be a grave violation of the right to a fair trial to deny defense 
counsel access to relevant documents or to bar defense counsel from ef-
fectively representing clients in closed hearings.231 For a finding of arbitrary 
detention, however, the right to counsel must be actively denied; failure 
of a defendant to request counsel is not grounds for a claim of arbitrary 
224. See, e.g., Naji Azziz Harb v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 20/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 101, ¶ 10 (2000); Moham-
mad Shahadeh et al. v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 6/2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1 at 39, ¶ 10 (2004); See also U 
Pa Pa Lay v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 38/2000, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 32, ¶ 9 (2000).
225. Gaybullo Jalilov v. Uzbekistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
4/2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/4, ¶ 62. Mr. Jalilov was not allowed to meet 
with his lawyer until over two months after his arrest. Id. ¶ 78. See also Opinions 
adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/21/Add. 
1, Opinion No. 14/2008 (Uzbekistan) at 137, ¶ 40 (2008).
226. “Sledgehammer” cases (Turkey), Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
6/2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/6, ¶ 77 (2013). 
227. Id. ¶ 77. The “Sledgehammer” cases in Turkey were the arrest and trial of 365 individu-
als accused of involvement in the alleged “’Sledgehammer’ Coup Plot.” Id. ¶ 6. The 
Working Group also found the right to confidential communication with an attorney was 
violated when public officials were present at all meetings between the individual and 
his attorney. Jason Zachary Puracal v. Nicaragua, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 10/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/10, ¶¶ 28–30 (2012).
228. Jaramani Najib Youcef v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1 at 64, ¶ 13 (2000); José Alexander v. Indonesia, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1 at 58, 61, ¶ 
18 (1999).
229. Andrei Sannikov v. Belarus, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 14/2012, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/14 at 3, ¶ 10 (2012).
230. Id. at 6, ¶ 38.
231. Id. at 3, 6, ¶¶12–14, 38–39. 
Vol. 38690 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
detention.232 In the case of foreign detainees, the right of access to consular 
services is similarly guaranteed.233 
4. Improper Admittance or Handling of Evidence During Trial
Once a trial has begun, an individual’s right to a fair trial may be violated if 
evidence presented against him or her is improperly admitted. Such improper 
evidence could have been obtained in violation of international standards or 
have been improperly handled. The right to a fair trial can also be violated 
if inappropriate emphasis is placed on specific evidence, for example, or 
by the application of an incorrect burden of proof.
a. Detention on the Basis of Evidence Extracted under Torture 
or Coerced by Threat of Force is Arbitrary
Admitting statements as evidence that were obtained through torture or 
other ill treatment “renders the proceedings as a whole unfair.”234 In Ilhom 
Ismailovich Ismonov v. Tajikistan (2013), Tajik authorities found that there 
had been an improper delay during which Mr. Ismonov did not have an 
opportunity to appear in front of a judicial officer for over a week after his 
arrest, and the investigating officers were disciplined for this mistake.235 This 
mistake, however, “deprived [Mr. Ismonov] of important safeguards against 
torture and ill-treatment and of consultation with legal counsel.”236 Since the 
court recognized this mistake, it erred by allowing a confession of “partial 
guilt” obtained during that period to be admitted and heavily relied upon by 
the prosecution in the proceedings against Mr. Ismonov.237 In a 2001 case 
concerning Uzbekistan, the Working Group found that a confession obtained 
in order to stop the torture of a family member is similarly sufficient for a 
finding of arbitrary detention.238 
232. Mikel Egibar Mitxelena v. Spain, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
26/1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 9, ¶¶ 11–13 (1999).
233. James Mawdsley v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
25/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 124, ¶ 10 (2000), citing the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, (entered into force 19 Mar. 1967).
234. Abdallah Hamoud Al-Twijri v. Iraq, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 43/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/43, ¶ 51 (2012).
235. Ilhom Ismailovich Ismonov v. Tajikistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 11/2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/11 at 4, ¶ 57 (2013). 
236. Id. ¶ 58. 
237. Id. ¶¶58–59. See also Mohamed Hajib v. Morocco, Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion, Opinion No. 40/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/40, ¶¶ 36–48 (finding that 
Mr. Hajib was “arrested, charged, judged and convicted on the basis of the confessions 
obtained under torture” and that Morocco’s judicial system’s over emphasis on confes-
sions encouraged such practices). 
238. Munavar and Ismail Hasanov v. Uzbekistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 1/2001, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 36, ¶¶ 5, 8 (2001).
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Individuals also have a “right not to be compelled to testify against oneself 
or to confess guilt”; confessions extracted through torture may not be the 
sole basis for an individual’s detention.239 Additionally, confessions must be 
made in the presence of legal counsel, especially confession made in police 
custody, or they are not admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings.240 
b. Imprisonment for Incitement to Criminal Activity by 
Authorities Amounts to Arbitrary Detention
In 2013, the Working Group issued an opinion concerning the case of De-
nis Matveyev, the head of a civil society organization working to combat 
corruption in Russia. Mr. Matveyev was asked on three separate occasions 
to purchase a small quantity of heroin on behalf of supposed drug addicts, 
who were actually undercover police officers.241 Mr. Matveyev gained no 
personal benefit from these transactions, but was aware of the withdrawal 
symptoms associated with heroin use and therefore used the entirety of 
the money given to him to obtain the drugs from the contact who he was 
instructed to approach.242 The Working Group relied on European Court of 
Human Rights rulings on similar Russian cases and concluded that Russia 
had violated Mr. Matveyev’s right to fair trial by basing his conviction on 
actions of the authorities that “did not confine themselves to investigating 
[the defendant’s] alleged criminal activity in a passive manner, but rather 
incited the commission of the offence.” 243 
c. Unequal Application of Standards and Evidentiary Burdens 
Amounts to a Violation of the Right to a Fair Trial
In 2012, the Working Group determined that the judicial authorities in 
Mexico disregarded the principle of presumption of innocence in the trial 
of Sánchez Ramírez.244 The trial judge disregarded the many discrepancies 
in the testimony of the police and government officers while simultaneously 
239. Tagi al-Maidan v. Bahrain, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 1/2014, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2014/1, ¶ 18 (2014).
240. Id. ¶ 22. (“The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt and 
access to counsel and legal aid are not only measures intended for the protection of the 
interests of the individual, but also measures in the interest of society as a whole of the 
trust in and the effectiveness of the judicial process and of the reliability of evidence.”)
241. Denis Matveyev v. Russia, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 8/2013, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/8, ¶¶ 6–12 (2013).
242. Id. ¶¶14–15.
243. Id. ¶¶ 68–70 (citing European Court of Human Rights, Khudobin v. Russia, App. No. 
59696/00, Judgment of 26 Oct. 2006, ¶ 133; European Court of Human Rights, Vanyan 
v. Russia, App. No. 53203/99, Judgment of 15 Dec. 2005, ¶ 49). 
244. Hugo Sánchez Ramírez v. Mexico, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 33/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/33, ¶ 18 (2012).
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ignoring the defendant’s statements, which were consistent at all times.245 
The Working Group found that the trial judge’s actions illustrated “unequal 
application of standards and criteria to the parties.”246
5. Improper Trial Procedures and Court Settings May Constitute a 
Violation of the Right to Fair Trial
a. Non-public Trial Can Be a Violation of the Minimal Norms 
for a Fair Trial
In Muhammad Kaboudvand v. Iran (2012), Mr. Kaboudvand, the founder of a 
democracy and human rights organization, was arrested and tried in a closed 
trial.247 The judges claimed the trial was closed in order to protect public 
morals.248 The Working Group considered this justification unrelated to Mr. 
Kaboudvand’s case and found that the process of a closed trial violated Mr. 
Kaboudvand’s right to a fair trial.249 This determination contrasts with Igor 
Sutyagin v. Russian Federation (2001), in which a closed-door trial on the 
charge of disseminating nuclear secrets was not in itself sufficient to give 
rise to a claim of arbitrary detention.250 
b. The Right to Fair Trial Includes the Right to be Present at 
One’s Trial and to Provide a Full Defense
In Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj v. Algeria (2001), the Working Group held 
that international instruments, including the Civil and Political Covenant, 
guaranteed the right to be present at one’s trial.251 In the case of an accused 
minor, this right extends to the minor’s family as well.252 Additionally, in Liu 
Xiaobo v. China (2011), Mr. Xiaobo was only provided with fourteen minutes 
to present his defense, despite the complexity of the charges against him.253 
The Working Group identified this lack of time as a “breach of fairness,” 
245. Id.
246. Id. ¶ 39.
247. Muhammad Kaboudvand v. Iran, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
48/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/48 ¶¶ 3–7 (2012).
248. Id. ¶ 7.
249. Id. ¶ 21.
250. Igor Sutyagin v. Russian Federation, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 14/2001, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 70, ¶¶ 7, 16 (2001).
251. Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, supra note 25, at 36, ¶ 24 (iii); see also 
ICCPR, supra note 10, at 52, art. 14(3)(d) (“In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full 
equality. . . . To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through 
legal assistance of his own choosing.”).
252. Maung Chan Thar Kyaw v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 16/2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, at 64, ¶ 11 (2004).
253. Liu Xiaobo v. China, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2011, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/15, at 4, ¶ 23 (2011).
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and therefore found that Mr. Xiaobo was arbitrarily deprived of his liberty 
due to violation of his right to a fair trial.254
c. Trial by a Tribunal that is Not Competent, Independent, and 
Impartial, Constitutes a Grave Violation of the Right to Fair Trial
The right to fair trial requires a competent, independent, and impartial tri-
bunal.255 Infringement on the presumption of innocence constitutes doubt 
of impartiality and thus violates the guarantee.256 For example, when Raúl 
Leonardo Linares Amundaray was tried in Venezuela for killing a home 
intruder for self-defense, the judge hearing the case was a “personal friend 
of the father of the deceased.”257 In 2012, the Working Group found that 
this connection violated Mr. Linares Amundaray’s right to an independent 
and impartial judge.258
The Working Group has also found that a violation of an individual’s 
right to a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal occurs when a 
civilian is inappropriately tried before a military tribunal. In Hana Yahya 
Shalabi v. Israel (2012), the Working Group found that Ms. Shalabi had 
been denied her right to fair trial by being tried in a military court which 
“lack[ed] transparency and adversarial procedure.”259
d. Faceless Courts Constitute a Violation of the Right to Fair 
Trial
Lori Berenson, a US citizen, was arrested in Peru during an armed clash with 
members of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and then convicted 
of treason by a “faceless” military court.260 In a 1998 opinion, the Working 
Group found that faceless courts, particularly military courts—the decisions 
of which cannot be challenged and which hand down judgments follow-
ing secret hearings with minimal defense guarantees—constitute a serious 
violation of the rules of due process.261 Trial before faceless judges, whether 
254. Id.
255. Former Captain Mustapha Adib v. Morocco, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 27/2001, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8/Add.1 at 27, 30, ¶ 20 (2001), citing 
ICCPR, supra note 10, at 52, art. 14(1).
256. Former Captain Mustapha Adib v. Morocco, supra note 255, at 29, ¶ 19. 
257. Raúl Linares Amundaray v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Working Group on Arbi-
trary Detention, Opinion No. 28/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/28, at 4, ¶ 26 
(2012).
258. Id.
259. Hana Yahya Shalabi v. Israel, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
20/2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2012/20, ¶ 26 (2012); see also 12 individuals v. 
Egypt, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 10/2014, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/WGAD/2014/10, ¶¶ 15–24 (2014).
260. Lori Berenson v. Peru, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Decision No. 26/1998, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1 at 12, 16, ¶ 6 (1998).
261. Id. at 13, ¶¶ 6–7.
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military or civilian, without any guarantee of independence or impartiality, 
infringes upon due process and confers an arbitrary character to the deten-
tion of the accused.262 
6. The Rights to Prompt Trial and Appeal are Guaranteed
Prolonged detention without trial violates international norms guaranteeing 
the right to a fair trial.263 The right to appeal one’s sentence, furthermore,264 
is guaranteed even against a sentence declared final.265
7. Retroactive Application of Criminal Legislation Constitutes a 
Violation of the Right to Fair Trial
Eleuterio Zárate Luján was detained under Peruvian Decree Law 25,659 
of 13 August 1992, in connection with a terrorist attack committed before 
the law became effective.266 The Working Group found this retroactive ap-
plication of this law constituted a flagrant violation of Article 15 of the Civil 
and Political Covenant, as well as Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the Universal 
Declaration.267 Mr. Luján’s detention was thus deemed arbitrary.268 
D. Category IV: Prolonged Administrative Custody of Asylum Seekers, 
Immigrants, or Refugees
The Commission on Human Rights first requested the Working Group to 
consider the situation of immigrants and asylum seekers being held in ad-
262. Edilberto Aguilar Mercedes v. Peru, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 29/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1 at 3, ¶¶ 9–10 (2000). Peru’s practice 
of faceless trials was reformed in Oct. 1997. Carlos Florentino Molero Coca v. Peru, 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 24/1998, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/
Add.1, at 8, ¶ 6 (1998).
263. The detainees in question were held without trial for ten years. Fateh Jamus and Issam 
Dimashqi v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 21/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 104, ¶ 15 (2000). Note that shorter 
detentions without warrant, charge, or trial were held arbitrary under category I. See 
supra § III(A)(1).
264. Naji Azziz Harb v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opin-
ion No. 20/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 101, ¶ 10 (2000); Mohammad 
Shahadeh et al. v. Syrian Arab Republic, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 6/2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, at 39, ¶ 10 (2004).
265. U Pa Pa Lay v. Myanmar, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 38/2000, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 32, ¶ 9 (2000).
266. Eleuterio Zárate Luján v. Peru, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
11/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 75, ¶¶ 5, 11–12, 14 (2000).
267. Id. ¶ 11. The practice can also be characterized as a violation of the prohibition against 
ex post facto laws (especially criminal laws). u.s. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, 
cl. 1.
268. Luján v. Peru, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 11/2000, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 75, ¶ 11.
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ministrative detention in 1997.269 The Working Group has since concluded 
that holding an undocumented immigrant or asylum seeker in administrative 
custody for excessive periods of time, without justifying the need for deten-
tion and without proper facilities, is an arbitrary detention.270
1. Denial of Asylum does not in itself Give Rise to a Claim of 
Arbitrary Detention, if the Subsequent Detention is not Open-Ended 
and is Subject to Periodic Review
The proper denial of asylum does not by itself give rise to a claim of arbitrary 
detention.271 Subsequent detention should not, however, be open-ended and 
should be subject to periodic review.272 In order to avoid arbitrarily detain-
ing an undocumented immigrant, governmental authorities must promptly 
bring the individual before an authority, whether judicial or other.273 The 
individual must receive a decision regarding his or her custody based on 
criteria established in legitimately created laws and detention must not be 
for an unlimited or excessive period of time.274 The detention must also 
be in a facility that separates undocumented immigrants from individuals 
detained under the State’s criminal laws. Alternatives to detention must be 
used where possible.275 Finally, the individual must receive an explanation 
of any custodial measures, including the process for applying for judicial 
remedy, in a language that he or she understands.276 Additionally, govern-
ments should only use detention as a last resort for attempting to establish 
the identities and nationalities of asylum seekers and undocumented im-
269. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/7/4, ¶ 41 
(10 Jan. 2008).
270. Id.
271. The person in question was denied asylum, then arrested several years later for over-
staying his visa. William Agyegyam v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 
15, ¶¶ 5, 7–9 (1999). 
272. Typically, the period in question is that between denial of asylum and subsequent depor-
tation. Pedro Katunda Kambangu v. Lithuania, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 24/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 119, ¶ 9–13, 21 (1999). 
In this event, Kambangu’s detention was not found arbitrary. Id. ¶ 23. However, the 
Working Group did find that the four and a half year detention of a Somali citizen, who 
was liable for removal which was delayed due to security concerns in his country of 
origin, was arbitrary due to excessive length. Mustafa Abdi v. United Kingdom, Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 45/2006, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4/Add.1, at 
40, ¶¶ 17, 31 (2006).
273. Mustafa Abdi v. United Kingdom, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
45/2006, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4/Add. 1, 40, ¶ 27 (2006).
274. Id. ¶¶ 27–32.
275. Id.
276. Id. In addition to these criteria, the Working Group also noted that “[w]here the chances 
of removal within a reasonable period are remote, a Government’s obligation to seek 
alternatives to detention becomes pressing.” Id. ¶ 25.
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migrants.277 Furthermore, expulsion should only be conducted in a humane 
manner and with full respect for international norms and the individual’s 
human dignity.278 
2. States Should Not Criminalize Irregular Migrants 
Raúl García was held in detention in Barbados for three years past the 
completion of his twenty-year sentence for drug related charges.279 Mr. Gar-
cía remained in detention awaiting deportation, however Cuba, his country 
of birth, refused to accept him.280 In 2013, the Working Group noted that 
if Mr. García was classified as stateless, then he could not be deported 
and expelled.281 Furthermore, the Working Group determined that if his 
deportation could not be achieved within a reasonable period, he must be 
released unless he poses a national security or public order threat.282 The 
Working Group concluded that migrants in an “irregular situation must not 
be regarded as criminals.”283
a. Harsh and Disproportionate Immigration Bond or Denial 
of Parole may Constitute Arbitrary Detention
Mohammed Bousloub, an Algerian citizen, was convicted of petty theft in 
the United States and sentenced to four months of imprisonment.284 Bous-
loub was to be deported at the end of his term, but Algeria failed to allow 
his repatriation and thus he remained in US custody detained for failure to 
post bond in the amount of $20,000 (USD).285 In 1999, the Working Group 
found the bond to be both harsh and disproportionate, in view of the means 
and status of the accused, which itself rendered his detention arbitrary.286 
Bousloub must be compared with Severino Puentes Sosa v. United 
States of America (1999) and César Manuel Guzmán Cruz v. United States 
277. Id. ¶ 25.
278. Referring to the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence, the Working Group 
found that detention is only justified when deportation proceedings are in progress. Zaza 
Yambala v. Switzerland, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 4/2011, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2011/4, ¶ 17 (2011). For Mr. Yambala, the Working Group 
found that two years had been sufficient time for Switzerland to expel him and that the 
subsequent expulsion of Mr. Yambala was unlikely, therefore Mr. Yambala should be 
released from detention. Id. ¶ 26. 
279. Raúl García v. Barbados, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 2/2013, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/2, ¶ 21 (2013).
280. Id. ¶ 25.
281. Id. ¶ 23.
282. Id. ¶ 25.
283. Id. ¶ 22.
284. Mohamed Bousloub v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 34, ¶ 5 (1999).
285. Id. ¶¶ 11, 19.
286. The fact that Bousloub could have appealed the bond was not sufficient to defeat the 
finding of arbitrary detention. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
2016 United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 697
of America (1999).287 Like Bousloub, Sosa and Cruz completed criminal 
sentences but could not be repatriated because their home country refused 
to accept them.288 Cruz, although convicted of second-degree murder, was 
found arbitrarily detained because the government did not sufficiently justify 
its denial of parole after his sentence was completed.289 Sosa, on the other 
hand, was not found to be arbitrarily detained because he had the benefit 
of regular, fair, and impartial parole hearings. He also had a serious criminal 
record as a result of his repeated parole violations.290 When denial of parole 
appears to have no justification, it may constitute arbitrary detention even if 
it occurs before the end of a detainee’s criminal sentence.291 
b. If Prolonged Administrative Detention is due to the 
Legitimate Exercise of Recourses and Appeals, it is not 
Arbitrary
Thai officials arrested Vatcharee Pronsivakulchai in 2000 and extradited 
her to the United States for alleged drug crimes.292 Once in the United 
States, Ms. Pronsivakulchai agreed to work with the US Drug Enforcement 
Agency and the charges against her were dropped.293 She then remained 
in administrative detention awaiting her return to Thailand according to 
the extradition agreement between the United States and Thailand.294 Ms. 
Pronsivakulchai applied for asylum in the United States and subsequently 
appealed the negative decision twice.295 In its opinion, the Working Group 
reaffirmed the general principle that asylum seekers should not be detained, 
but found that, in Ms. Pronsivakulchai’s case, her detention was based on 
her pending extradition to face drug charges in Thailand. Furthermore, the 
287. Severino Puentes Sosa v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 28 (1999); César Manuel Guzmán Cruz v. United 
States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/
Add.1 at 38 (1999). Note the distinction from Humberto Alvarez Machaín v. United 
States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27, 
135 (1993), which is the case associated with Sosa v. Alverez-Machaín, 542 U.S. 692 
(2004).
288. Sosa v. United States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 28, ¶ 11; César Manuel 
Guzmán Cruz v. United States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 38, ¶ 18; see also 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
289. Cruz v. United States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 38, ¶ 18–19.
290. Sosa v. United States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1, at 28, ¶ 25.
291. Jan Borek v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 
No. 34/2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.1, at 16, ¶¶ 18–24 (2000). Note also 
that Borek does not appear to rest upon the detainees’ immigrant status. Id. 
292. Vatcharee Pronsivakulchai v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/21/Add.1, at 68, ¶¶ 26–27 (2009).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. See also Pronsivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2006); Pron-
sivakulchai v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2011).
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length of the detention was due to her “legitimate exercise of all possible 
recourses and appeals.”296
E. CATEGoRY V: DEPRIVATIoN of LIbERTY AS A VIoLATIoN of 
INTERNATIoNAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATIoN STANDARDS
International law prohibits discrimination based on “race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.”297 Therefore, if deprivation of liberty is due to reasons of 
discrimination on any of these grounds, then it amounts to arbitrary detention. 
1. Religious Discrimination Cannot be Justified as Combating 
Terrorism
Detention for terrorism cannot be used as a pretense for religious persecu-
tion.298 Gaybullo Jalilov, an Uzbek human rights activist whose work focused 
on the persecution of independent Muslims, was arrested for and convicted 
of religious extremism, including “terrorism, incitement of ethnic, racial or 
religious hatred. . . [and] direction of or participation in a religious extrem-
ist, separatist, fundamentalist or other banned organization.”299 In 2013, 
the Working Group found that the Uzbek government had not provided 
evidence of a link between Mr. Jalilov and any extremist organization or a 
call to violence.300 Therefore, Mr. Jalilov was deemed arbitrarily detained 
for being a practicing Muslim and for criticizing the Uzbek government’s 
treatment of Muslims.301 
2. Detention on Account of Sexual Orientation is Arbitrary
In May 2001, Egyptian officials arrested approximately fifty men during a 
raid on the Queen Boat discotheque, moored on the Nile River in Cairo.302 
The government denied that the men were detained on account of their 
sexual orientation, but charged them instead with immoral behavior and 
contempt of religion.303 The Working Group found that all but two of the men 
were prosecuted for homosexuality.304 The Working Group then found that 
296. Vatcharee Pronsivakulchai v. United States of America, supra note 292, ¶¶ 25, 28–29.
297. ICCPR, supra note 10, at 52, art. 26; see also UDHR, supra note 10, at 71, art. 2, 7.
298. Gaybullo Jalilov v. Uzbekistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
4/2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2013/4, ¶¶ 69–76 (2013).
299. Id. ¶¶4–14. 
300. Id. ¶ 73.
301. Id. ¶ 74. 
302. Yasser Mohamed Salah v. Egypt, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2003/8/Add.1, at 69, ¶ 5 (2002).
303. Id. ¶¶ 5–8.
304. Id. at 71 ¶ 25.
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Article 26 of the Civil and Political Covenant applied to sexual orientation 
as well as biological sex (in agreement with other United Nations human 
rights bodies) and that detention on account of homosexuality was therefore 
arbitrary under both the Covenant (Article 2, Paragraphs 1 and 26) and the 
Universal Declaration (Article 2, Paragraph 1).305 
IV. CoNCLUSIoN
Over the past two decades, the Working Group has addressed a broad range 
of issues related to arbitrary detention. Through its investigation of individual 
complaints, as well as its deliberations and reports addressing broad trends, 
the Working Group has interpreted existing international standards, applicable 
to government detention of individuals, with increasing precision. 
Furthermore, while the Working Group’s proceedings are not intended 
to approach the formality and rigor of a court of law, it can fairly be said 
that the Working Group’s objectivity and incrementalism have built cred-
ibility in the international human rights community. Recent Working Group 
opinions, especially in high profile cases, have received public attention and 
international media coverage as persuasive indicators that the detentions 
under discussion were of questionable legal validity.306 NGOs and other 
organizations have used the Working Group’s involvement in specific cases 
to put pressure on governments and to draw public attention to the plight 
of individuals they seek to free from detention.307
Additionally, the Working Group has managed to maintain its relevance 
by responding with flexibility to changes in the global geopolitical envi-
ronment. For example, as discussed above, the global increase in refugees 
and irregular immigrants held in prolonged administrative custody led the 
Working Group to create a new category of arbitrary detention to require 
that such individuals are offered meaningful redress. Similarly, the Working 
Group concluded that the detention of individuals as a result of their sexual 
305. Id. at 72–73 ¶¶ 27–28. Note that the Working Group did not classify arbitrary deten-
tion on account of sexual orientation under any of the three categories.
306. See, e.g., Oliver Holmes, UN Group Condemns Malaysia’s “Arbitrary” Detention of 
Anwar Ibrahim, tHe guArdiAn (2 Nov. 2015), available at http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/nov/02 (reporting WGAD Opinion that opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim, 
was arbitrarily detained and tortured).
307. Joby Warrick, Washington Post Petitions U.N. to Help Free Journalist Held in Iran, WAsH. 
post, 22 Jul 2015, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world (reporting petition 
to WGAD seeking release of Washington Post journalist, Jason Rezaian, detained by 
Iran); Edward Wong, U.N. Rights Group Calls on China to Release Lawyer, n.y. times, 
28 Mar. 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/asia/29china.html 
(reporting WGAD Opinion that prominent Chinese human rights lawyer, Gao Zhisheng, 
was arbitrarily detained and noted that the story was brought to the attention of the 
press through a public statement issued by China Human Rights Defenders).
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orientation or membership in other protected classes merits a separate cat-
egory of arbitrary detention to address such discrimination. 
As the Working Group continues to address the proper conditions, pro-
cedures, and justifications for deprivation of liberty, hopefully state actors will 
feel obliged to respond in a more engaged manner to the Working Group’s 
opinions. Furthermore, the authors hope that NGOs and public and private 
institutions will more effectively utilize the Working Group’s resources to 
bring attention to the problem of arbitrary detention, as well as to protect 
individuals whose rights have been violated. If the Working Group continues 
to gain acceptance as an authoritative international arbiter of the legality of 
detention by states, it may be able to make an even greater contribution to 
the global effort to eliminate arbitrary detention. 
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APPENDIx oNE: MoDEL QUESTIoNNAIRE To bE 
CoMPLETED bY PERSoNS ALLEGING ARbITRARY 
ARREST oR DETENTIoN308
[A separate questionnaire must be completed for each case of alleged ar-
bitrary arrest or detention. As far as possible, all details requested should 
be given. Nonetheless, failure to do so will not be necessarily result in the 
inadmissibility of the communication.]
I. IDENTITY 
1. Family name: ………………………………… 
2. First name: ……………………………...…… 
3. Sex: (Male) (Female) 
4. Birth date or age (at the time of detention): ……………………………… 
5. Nationality/Nationalities:…………………………………………………….
6. (a) Identity document (if any): ……………………………………………… 
 (b) Issued by: ………………………………………………………………… 
 (c) On (date): ………………………………………………………………… 
 (d) No.: ………………………………………………………………………..
7.  Profession and/or activity (if believed to be relevant to the arrest/deten-
tion): 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
8. Address of usual residence: 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
308. Model Questionnaire to be Completed by Persons Alleging Arbitrary Arrest of Deten-
tion, offiCe of HigH Commissioner for HumAn rigHts, available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Detention/WGADQuestionnaire_en.pdf.
Vol. 38702 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
ARREST
[For the purpose of this questionnaire, “arrest” refers to the initial act of 
apprehending a person. “Detention” means and includes detention before, 
during and after trial. In some cases, only section II, or section III may be 
applicable. Nonetheless, whenever possible, both sections should be filled 
in. III.]
1. Date of arrest:……………………………………………………………… 
2. Place of arrest (as detailed as possible): 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
3. Forces who carried out the arrest or are believed to have carried it out: 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
4. Did they show a warrant or other decision by a public authority? 
 (Yes) ........ (No)......... 
5. Authority who issued the warrant or decision: 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
6. Relevant legislation applied (if known): 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
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…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
DETENTIoN
[For the purpose of this questionnaire, “arrest” refers to the initial act of 
apprehending a person. “Detention” means and includes detention before, 
during and after trial. In some cases, only section II, or section III may be 
applicable. Nonetheless, whenever possible, both sections should be filled in.]
1. Date of detention: ……………………………………………………………… 
2. Duration of detention (if not known, probable duration):
…………………………………… 
3. Forces holding the detainee under custody: 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
4. Places of detention (indicate any transfer and present place of detention): 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
5. Authorities that ordered the detention: 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
6. Reasons for the detention imputed by the authorities: 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
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…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
7. Relevant legislation applied (if known): 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
IV.  Describe the circumstances of the arrest and/or the detention and indicate 
precise reasons why you consider the arrest or detention to be arbitrary. 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
V.  Indicate internal steps, including domestic remedies, taken especially with 
the legal and administrative authorities, particularly for the purpose of 
establishing the detention and, as appropriate, their results or the reasons 
why such steps or remedies were ineffective or why they were not taken. 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
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VI.  Full name and address of the person(s) submitting the information (tele-
phone and fax number, if possible).** 
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
…………..............…………………………………………....…………....….
Date: …………………… Signature: ……………............…… 
**If a case is submitted to the Working Group by anyone other than the victim 
or his family, such person or organization should indicate authorization by 
the victim or his family to act on their behalf. If, however, the authorization 
is not readily available, the Working Group reserves the right to proceed 
without the authorization. All details concerning the person(s) submitting 
the information to the Working Group, and any authorization provided by 
the victim or his family, will be kept confidential.
